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INTRODUCTION
Churches are exempted from a variety of taxes collected by the vari-
t Associate, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.; J.D., Duke Law School, 1995;
M.A., UCLA, 1992; B.A., University of North Carolina, 1990.
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ous levels and jurisdictions of government in the United States. For in-
stance, they are almost always exempt from payment of property tax at the
local level' and from payment of income tax to both state and federal gov-
ernment.2 They are often exempt from payment of state sales tax on the
products they sell.3 A person making a contribution to a religious organi-
zation is usually entitled to deduct the contribution from his income when
calculating both his state and his federal income taxes at the end of the tax-
able year.4 A minister is usually allowed to exclude from his taxable in-
come the rental value of the home provided to him by his church, or the
cash allowance paid to him by his church for the securing of a home, when
calculating both his state and federal income taxes.'
This article provides an overview of the history and practice of relig-
ious tax exemption in America and addresses whether religious tax exemp-
tions violate the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution,
1. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-278.3 (1995) (exempting from property tax real
property used for religious purposes), 105-278.4 (educational purposes), 105-278.6 (charita-
ble purposes), 105-278.8 (charitable educational purposes); Wis. STAT. § 70.11 (1997) (ex-
empting from property tax property owned and used exclusively by churches or religious,
educational, or benevolent institutions); ALA. CONST. art. 4, § 91 (providing that legislature
shall not tax property "used exclusively for religious worship").
2. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994) (exempting from income tax "corporations,
and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for re-
ligious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes");
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-2-4 (1988) (exempting from income tax "religious, educational, be-
nevolent, or other organizations not organized for profit which are exempt from income
taxation under the Internal Revenue Code").
3. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.13(31)(a) (1998) (exempting from sales tax
food sold by church when proceeds of sale are used for religious activities). The Supreme
Court ruled in 1990 that a sales tax exemption on products sold by a religious organization
was not required by either the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause. Jimmy
Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 398 (1990).
4. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 170 (1994) (allowing charitable contribution deduction in-
cluding for contributions to religious organizations); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:8A-37(b)(4)
(1998) (allowing "deducting of any charitable contribution not in excess of 10% of the tax-
payer's gross income which is made by the taxpayer within the taxable year to a religious
organization, an educational organization, [etc.]").
5. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) ("In the case of a minister of the gospel, gross
income does not include-(1) the rental value of a home furnished to him as part of his
compensation; or (2) the rental allowance paid to him as part of his compensation, to the
extent used by him to rent or provide a home."); W.VA. CODE § 11-3-9 (1966) (exempting
from property tax "parsonages, and the household goods and furniture pertaining thereto").
Other types of religious tax exemption could be added to this short list. See, e.g., MONT.
CODE ANN. § 15-6-201(b) (1997) (exempting from property tax residences of the clergy);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-3(2) (exempting from inheritance tax property passing to churches,
hospitals, and orphanages); see also Arvo Van Alstyne, Tax Exemption of Church Property,
20 OmIo ST. L.J. 1 (1958) (useful, if somewhat dated, overview of religious exemptions in
state tax codes).
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which provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion." 6 It is the thesis of this article that, in light of the history
of both tax exemptions and the clause itself, and despite the conventional
wisdom that tax exemption is tantamount to a subsidy, religious tax ex-
emptions do not violate the Establishment Clause ban on direct aid to re-
ligion; that neither religious tax exemptions nor taxation of religious enti-
ties violates the prohibition on entanglement of church and state; but that,
depending on the larger legislative scheme in question, and whether con-
ventional charitable institutions are similarly exempted, religious tax ex-
emptions may violate the norm of "equal treatment" also embodied in the
clause. It is the goal of this piece to cast doubt on the current tendency of
courts and commentators casually to refer to tax exemptions as "subsidies"
without exploring the implications of the word choice and to urge a re-
newed look at the "equal treatment" and "religious gerrymandering" theo-
ries of Justice Harlan.
I. RELIGIOUS TAX EXEMPTIoNS
A. The Lesson From History
Religious tax exemptions extend as far into the past as do written rec-
ords, and the literature addressing this history is vast. It indicates that the
raising of revenue and the exempting of religious entities have varied tre-
mendously over time. Nevertheless, the information available suggests that
the decision whether and how to tax or to exempt churches tends to reflect
the relative power of sovereign and church. Exemptions for priests and
temples in ancient Egypt, Sumeria, Babylon, and Persia, for example, were
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Twenty-seven years ago the Supreme Court ruled that the
Establishment Clause does not forbid a city to exempt religious organizations from payment
of property tax, at least when other nonprofit entities are also exempt from that tax. Walz v.
Tax Comm. of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970). Although there have been no further Su-
preme Court rulings on religious tax exemptions (state or federal) and the Establishment
Clause, there have been lower court and state court rulings, and there has been no shortage
of secondary literature. Often building on Boris Bittker's seminal 1969 article written in
anticipation of the Walz decision, Boris Bittker, Churches, Taxes, and The Constitution, 78
YALE L.J. 1285 (1969), the vast majority of these pieces address discrete sub-topics, such as
the parsonage exclusion of the federal income tax code or religious tithing in bankruptcy.
See, e.g., Dean T. Barham, The Parsonage Exclusion Under the Endorsement Test: Last
Gasp or Second Wind, 13 VA. TAX REV. 397 (1993); Maggie Flynn, Witchcraft and Tax
Exempt Status Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 763
(1987); Matthew W. Foster, Note, The Parsonage Allowance Exclusion: Past, Present, and
Future, 44 VAND. L. REv. 149 (1991); Terry L. Slye, Rendering Unto Caesar: Defining
"Religion "for Purposes ofAdministering Religious-Based Tax Exemptions, 6 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 219 (1983).
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the necessary byproduct of a very uneasy relationship between palace and
temple--one of shared power and yet constant competition for actual
authority. In the ancient world, the decision not to tax was largely a deci-
sion not to antagonize.7 The combination of wealth, power, and exemption
in the hands of the temples created a genuine problem for the ancient
economies that would later be noted by James Madison-the economic
instability that can result when large amounts of productive property are
owned by entities that are tax-exempt.' Under Ramses II, for instance,
7. Professor Durant notes, for instance, that in ancient Babylon the priests were simply
more powerful than the kings. DuRAT, OUR ORIENTAL HERITAGE 234 (1954). Much evi-
dence of ancient practices of tax exemption can be found scattered throughout the Old Tes-
tament. See, e.g., Genesis 47:26 ("Joseph made it a law over the land of Egypt unto this
day, that the Pharaoh should have the fifth part; except the land of the priests only.") (reign
of Ramses II, 1300-1233 b.c.); Ezra 7:24 ("It shall not be lawful to impose toll, tribute, or
custom upon.., priests.., or ministers of the house of God.") (reign of Solomon, 974-937
b.c.). See generally Durant, supra; John W. Whitehead, Tax Exemption and Churches: A
Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 22 CuMB. L. REV. 521, 524-28 (1991-92); John D.
Colombo, Why Is Harvard Tax Exempt (And Other Mysteries of Tax Exemption For Private
Educational Institutions), 35 Amu. L. REV. 841, 845 n.12 (1993). See also MARTIN A.
LARSON & C. STANLEY LOWELL, PRAISE THE LORD FOR TAX EXEMPTION 10-11 (1969) for a
cataloging and contextualizing of Old Testament references to tax exemption.
8. Particularly late in his life, Madison spoke out against church acquisition of prop-
erty. "There is an evil," he wrote, "which ought to be guarded [against] in the indefinite
accumulation of property from the capacity of holding it in perpetuity by ecclesiastical cor-
porations." JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 89-94 (Alley, ed., 1985) (excerpts from
The Detached Memoranda, in WILLIAM AND MARY QuARTERLY (1946)). Indeed, he argued,
"[t]he excessive wealth of ecclesiastical Corporations and the misuse of it in many Coun-
tries of Europe... has long been a topic of complaint." Id. In fact, in some of these coun-
tries, "the Church has amassed half perhaps the property of the nation." Id. These con-
cerns were also echoed in letters he wrote at the time. See, e.g., Letter to J. K. Pauldin
(March 10, 1897), reprinted in 9 WRrrINGS OF JAMES MADISON 281; Letter to Reverend
Adams (1832), reprinted in 9 WRITINGS OF JAWES MADISON 487. A number of people have
inferred from these writings that the Establishment Clause itself, drafted by Madison some
twenty or thirty years earlier, was meant to prohibit religious tax exemptions. See, e.g.,
Robert Maddox, Churches and Taxes: Should We Praise the Lord for Tax Exemptions, 22
CumB. L. REv. 471, 472 (1991-92). Similar inferences are drawn from other comments in
his later writings-particularly the misgivings he expressed about the use of chaplains in
Congress and in the national army and navy and about religious proclamations issued by the
executive. See, e.g., Kyle D. Freeman, Note, Robinson v. City of Richmond: Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence and a Case for Governmental Acknowledgment of the Historical Role
of Religion, 32 TULSA L.J. 605, 617 n.157 (1997) (arguing Madison "recanted" the consti-
tutionality of congressional chaplains); Verna Sanchez, All Roads Are Good: Beyond the
Lexicon of Christianity in Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L. J. 31, 32
n.7 (1997) (presidential religious proclamations and chaplain system); Jonathan C. Drim-
mer, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Duty of Public Schools to Limit Student-Proposed
Graduation Prayers, 74 NEB. L. REv. 411, 415 n.15 (1995) (chaplains); Laura Underkuf-
fler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A Foundational Challenge to
First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 837, 952-53 (1995) (chaplains). Al-
though it is clear that Madison worried that the concentration of property (power) in
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priests owned as much as one-seventh of Egypt's productive land, which
may have been partly responsible for the regime's ultimate economic col-
lapse.9
Similarly, much has been written about Henry Viii's decision to con-
fiscate the vast wealth of the Church once he severed ties with Rome in the
sixteenth century."0 A century later Oliver Cromwell, too, would levy stiff
taxes on church property." These and other examples demonstrate the very
real threat to a church's existence when the ability to tax is wielded by a
sovereign bent on destruction (or at least subordination) of the institution.
It is no surprise, then, that when medieval European monarchs taxed the
church to support their wars, the papacy rebelled-Pope Boniface argued,
when monasteries in England and France faced such taxation by Philip IV
and Edward I in 1294, that the freedom of the Church was grounded in its
economic independence. 12
Modem separation theory-the American commitment to a "wall of
separation" between church and state-relies in part on this historical rec-
ord for the proposition that separation protects and preserves both religious
liberty and the political arena.13 There is in fact considerable evidence that
the American "experiment of the mutual independence of religious and
political sovereignties" resulted from a desire to avoid precisely this "con-
tinual struggle for supremacy between Prince and Pope." 14 Thus the writ-
ings of Roger Williams, the Baptist founder of Rhode Island to whom the
metaphor of the wall is traced, reflect the notion that there should be a
"hedge or wall of separation between the garden of the church and the wil-
derness of the world."' 5 Separation was justified, Williams believed, by
churches was a threat to religious liberty, it is not clear from the Detached Memoranda that
he viewed taxation as a way to discourage accumulation of property/power. In any event,
the focus of these essays was not the federal constitution or the constitutional notion of es-
tablishment; it was the principle of "religious liberty" and "equal rights." The writings
read more like essays on practices that endanger religious freedom (and the Virginia Gen-
eral Assembly did vote down a religious tax exemption while he was a delegate, although
his own vote on the matter is unrecorded) than like an explanation of what the Establish-
ment Clause would have prohibited had it applied to the states.
9. Colombo, supra note 7, at 845 n.12; see also DURANT supra note 7, at 214; LARSON
& LOWELL, supra note 7, at 10.
10. See, e.g., J.J. ScARISBRICK, HENRY VIII 241-338 (1968) (on the Henrician Refor-
mation); see also id. at 536-42 (bibliography referencing secondary sources on the economic
aspect of this reformation).
11. Whitehead, supra note 7, at 530.
12. Id. at 530-31; DURANT, supra note 7, at 812-13.
13. Whitehead, supra note 7, at 545.
14. LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE& FREEDOM 16-17 (1953).
15. Robert S. Peck, The Threat To The American Idea Of Religious Liberty, 46
MERCER L. REv. 1123, 1129 (1995) (quoting Williams that there should be a "hedge or wall
Syracuse Law Review [Vol. 49:971
the necessity of keeping the state out of the affairs of church, lest church be
subordinated to the state. Once the wall was broken down, he argued, "the
authority and power of the government would corrupt the churches. 6 Jef-
ferson added-most famously in an 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptist As-
sociation-that the wall would also "keep the church out of the business of
government, lest the government be subordinated to the church." 7 Over
the last two centuries, many American political theorists and theologians
have argued that by reducing government regulation and oversight of re-
ligious bodies, and by reducing formal contact between church and state,
tax exemption furthers separation in the Jefferson/Williams sense. And this
much is certain: exemption decreases the possibility of a Cromwellian ef-
fort to subjugate religious organizations through oppressive taxation, and
thus presumably protects religious liberty."
B. The American Experience
The practice of " establishing" a church by force of law made its way
across the Atlantic with the early colonists. So, too, did the tendency to
exempt churches from taxation. 9 Each colony was a political culture unto
itself: the practice of establishment varied, the practice of tax collection
varied, and the practice of tax exemption varied.2"
of separation between the garden of the church and the wilderness of the world"); see also
PAUL J. WEBER & DENNIS A. GILBERT, PRIVATE CHURCHES AND PUBLIC MONEY: CHURCH-
GOVERNMENT FISCAL RELATIONS 4 (1981).
16. WEBER & GILBERT, supra note 15, at 4.
17. LEONARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 246 (1944); Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court,
29 U. CH. L. REv. 1, 4 (1961) (" [Separation] is justified in Williams' terms by the neces-
sity for keeping the state out of the affairs of the church, lest the church be subordinated to
the state; in Jeffersonian terms its function is to keep the church out of the business of gov-
ernment, lest the government be subordinated to the church."); John Witte, Jr., The Essen-
tial Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Constitutional Framework, 71 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 371, 400 (1996) (Jefferson "tied the principle of separationism directly to the
principle of liberty of conscience").
18. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 243 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (" [T]he
flat ban on subsidization.., expresses the hard lesson learned over and over again in the
American past and in the experiences of the countries from which we have come, that re-
ligions supported by governments are compromised just as surely as the religious freedom
of dissenters is burdened when the government supports religion.") (citing Madison and
Willams).
19. John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of Church Property: Historical Anomaly or Valid
Constitutional Principle?, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 368-80 (1991); see also Colombo, supra
note 7, at 844 (Religious and educational institutions "were exempted from local taxes from
the beginning.").
20. See Witte, supra note 19, at 372-78 (overview of tax exemptions in colonial Vir-
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire);
1999] Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause
There is considerable dispute as to how many colonies had an "estab-
lished church" and what exactly it is that one is counting.2' One estimate
holds that at the time of the Revolution, established churches existed in at
least ten of the thirteen colonies-the Anglican Church of England in Vir-
ginia, Maryland, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia; the Congre-
gational Church in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire; the
Episcopal Church in New York; and the Dutch Reformed Church in New
Jersey.22 If one looks to states that disbursed tax revenue to a church or
churches, in the years immediately following the revolution (i.e., the years
leading up to the ratification of the Establishment Clause), nearly every
state had a law "establishing religion." 23
In some instances, a state merely authorized its towns to establish a
religion, limited to the Protestant sects, which would be supported by taxes
raised from all the residents in the town. This was the pattern in New
England, the result being that the established religion in one town might
well be the dissenting religion in another.24 Often a dissenting individual
had the option of directing his money toward a Protestant sect of his own
choosing, although not, apparently, to "no sect whatsoever."25 Disestab-
lishment also took a different path in each state, the pace varying consid-
erably. 6 By 1787, for example, Virginia, New York, Maryland, and North
see also CAROLYN WEBER, A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND EXPENDITURE IN THE WESTERN
WORLD 363 (1986). Weber notes, for instance, that colonial New England favored direct
taxation of personal property, house, and land, while the Southern colonies favored indirect
taxes on exports and imports. Both imposed the poll tax with a considerable number of
exemptions; in New England, for instance, governors, schoolteachers, ministers, invalids,
and Harvard College students were exempt.
2 1. See Jed Rubenfeld, Anti-disestablishmentarianism: Why RFRA Really Was Uncon-
stitutional, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2347, 2351-57 (1997).
22. Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 2083, 2099 (1996); see also ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 4 (1982) (listing established churches in
nine of the thirteen colonies). See generally SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (1902).
23. Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 2351; see also PFEFFER, supra note 14, at 92 (At the
time of the Revolution, "compulsory support of religion was the rule rather than the excep-
tion" and "some type of establishment existed in most of the thirteen colonies .... ");
THOMAS CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 24-76, 82-133 (1986) (colony-by-colony breakdown
for seventeenth and eighteenth centuries).
24, See LEONARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 8-12 (2d ed. 1994); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 2352 (giving exam-
ples of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont authorizing each town to
tax its residents for the support of Protestant teachers).
25. LEVY, supra note 24, at 26-51.




Carolina had disestablished 7 In other states it was a more gradual proc-
ess-Vermont did not disestablish until 1807, New Hampshire not until
1819, and Massachusetts not until 1833 8 Two facts about this period,
however, stand out: at the time of the revolution, most colonies had an
"established" church, and over the next two decades nearly every one
"disestablished" that same church.
Established churches were exempt from "ecclesiastical taxes" such as
the church rate and the tithe, which were paid into their own coffers.29 By
way of contrast, churches were apparently not uniformly exempted from
the variety of other property taxes (such as the land tax, the hearth tax, and
the quitrent) that were sporadically collected in each colony.30 Property
held by a minister was taxed in some colonies and exempt in others, al-
though the trend over time was to exempt it.31 Property dedicated to chari-
table uses (including religious uses32) was often exempted from the collec-
tion of poor rates, education rates, charity tax, and the like-and, indeed,
churches (whether established or dissenting) usually received cash dis-
bursements from the revenue generated in this way.33
The formative years of the republic gave each new state the opportu-
nity to consider the appropriateness of tax exemptions for church property.
Significantly, most left in place, enacted, or reenacted statutes either per-
27. CORD, supra note 22, at 4.
28. Id.; see also COBB, supra note 22, at 234; Epstein, supra note 22, at 2100. See
generally Herbert W. Titus, No Taxation or Subsidization: Two Indispensable Principles of
Freedom of Religion, 22 CUMB. L. REv. 505, 507 (1991-92).
29. Witte, supra note 19, at 371, 372-73.
30. Id. at 374.
31. Id.at373&n.39.
32. British common law has considered "charitable uses" to include "religious uses"
since at least the middle of the seventeenth century. While the Statute of Charitable Uses,
passed in 1601 to enforce charitable trusts, did not explicitly include "religious uses," the
advancement of religion was quickly recognized by the English courts as a charitable pur-
pose. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 589 (1983) (citing Lord
McNaghten for the proposition that charity comprises four divisions including "trusts for
the advancement of religion"); Whitehead, supra note 7, at 535 (" [A]dvancement of relig-
ion has been recognized as a charitable purpose by the British common law of charitable
trusts since at least 1639."); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-l (1997). Federal regulations
define "charity" as including
[r]elief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of re-
ligion; advancement of education or science; erection or maintenance of public
buildings, monuments, or works; lessening the burdens of Government; and pro-
motion of social welfare by organization designed to accomplish any of the above
purposes or (i) to lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and
discrimination; (iii) to defend human and civil rights secured by law; or (iv) to
combat community deterioration and juvenile delinquency. Id. (emphasis added).
33. Witte, supra note 19, at 377-78.
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mitting or mandating charitable and religious exemptions from local prop-
erty tax, and many new state constitutions explicitly addressed the topic. 34
This occurred concurrently with the disestablishment movement, which
suggests that the two courses of action were not at the time thought to be
inconsistent.35 In 1799, for instance, the New York legislature exempted
from real and personal property tax a variety of entities including churches,
land and houses owned by the United States government, schoolhouses,
courts, gaols, alms houses, and libraries.36 Similar laws were passed in
1801, 1813, and 1823.31 And New York had just, during the Revolutionary
War, repealed the statutes that had established the Episcopalian Church.38
A similar exemption was passed in Virginia in 1800, when Madison was a
member of its General Assembly and only one year after the state's final
disestablishment bill.39 Exemptions from property tax of property dedi-
cated to religious uses or belonging to religious associations, while differ-
ently formulated and worded across the several states40 and through the two
centuries, have been a consistent and stable feature of our tax collection
system, dating to the very point in time when states disestablished their
churches, and they remain a consistent feature of state tax schemes.41
34. See Institute of Living v. Town and City of Hartford, 50 A.2d 822, 823 (Conn.
1946) (Connecticut exempted property "given or granted for the maintenance of the minis-
try of the gospel" from taxation in 1702, re-enacted the same in 1808, suspended it from
1821 to 1851, and then re-instated it in 1851); St. Stanislaus Kosta Church v. Mayor of
Wilmington, 105 A.2d 596, 598 (Del. Supr. Ct. 1954) (Delaware exempted from property
tax property belonging to "church, country, religious society, or parish" in its 1796 code);
see also Reka Potgieter Hoff, The Financial Accountability of Churches for Federal Income
Tax Purposes: Establishment or Free Exercise?, 11 VA. TAX REV. 71, 108 (1991).
35. There were, of course, challenges to religious tax exemptions in state courts during
the nineteenth century. Challengers alleged that the exemptions were vestiges of religious
establishment and contrary to the particular state's constitution, and the point was echoed in
pamphlets and editorials at the time. Witte, supra note 19, at 380-86. Professor Witte ar-
gues that the complaints were "not just isolated musings," but in any event, the challenges
were uniformly rejected. Id. at 383; see, e.g., Trustees of Griswold College v. State, 46
Iowa 275, 282 (1877); State v. Collector of New Jersey, 24 N.J.L. 108, 120 (1853); Congre-
gational Soc'y v. Ashley, 10 Vt. 241, 24446 (1838).
36. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 683 (1970).
37. Brief of the State of New York at 6-7, Walz, 397 U.S. 664.
38. CORD, supra note 22, at 4.
39. II Va. Stat. at Large 200 (Shepherd's) (the 1800 tax statute); II Va. Stat. at Large
149 (Shepherd's) (the 1799 disestablishment bill).
40. In the District of Columbia an 1802 act exempted church property from taxation in
the City of Washington, and the exemption was left in place by Congress when it incorpo-
rated the city in 1804. Act of October 6, 1802, ch. 5, Rothwell's Laws of the City of
Washington 20 (1833) (tax exemption); Act of February 24, 1804, ch.14, 2 Stat. 254 (incor-
poration).
41. A wave of revisions in the mid-nineteenth century eliminated what were perceived
to be cumbersome and complicated lists of exempt entities, but there is no indication that the
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The federal government, too, has always exempted religious institu-
tions from tax collection. The first comprehensive federal income tax
law,42 the Revenue Act of 1894, 4 exempted "corporations, companies, or
associations organized and conducted solely for charitable, religious, or
educational purposes." 44 The Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909 included
an income tax bill that exempted corporations and associations "organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational pur-
poses."45  And the 1913 income tax law attached to the Underwood-
Simmons Tariff Act 46-- enacted shortly after the ratification of the Six-
teenth Amendment--contained a similar exemption. 47 Indeed, every fed-
eral income tax law since the Revenue Act of 1894 has contained the re-
ligious and charitable organization exemption that eventually became § 501
of the Internal Revenue Code.48 The Revenue Act of 1894 also contained a
legislative revisions were a response to anti-establishment challenges. Witte, supra note 19,
at 383-86. In any event, the revisions did not eliminate religious and charitable exemptions.
Id.
42. This was not the first federal revenue measure to tax income. The federal govern-
ment had been levying taxes on income since at least the Civil War. See generally
RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNrrED STATES 9-15 (1954) (discussion of 1862
revenue measure and subsequent measures taken to finance the war effort). For better or for
worse, the possibility of a regularly levied federal income tax has been a part of the political
landscape since that point. See, e.g., id. at 30-31 (noting the many income tax bills intro-
duced in Congress in the last half of the nineteenth century and discussing the debate over
the appropriateness of such a tax).
43. Act of August 27, 1894, 28 Stat. 556 (1894), found unconstitutional, Pollock v.
Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). For a discussion of the Act and the case,
see PAUL, supra note 42, at 32-64.
44. 28 Stat. 556. Britain's first comprehensive income tax, enacted half a century ear-
lier, similarly exempted income generated by property used for charitable-including relig-
ious-purposes. Whitehead, supra note 7, at 531. The legislative history of the American
law contains no discussion of its exemption, which supports Professor Colombo's argument
that the federal legislature believed itself simply to be including a noncontroversial practice
already universal at the state and local level. Colombo, supra note 7, at 845. This was not,
however, the first federally-enacted tax exemption for churches. An 1815 statute had levied
a tax on household furniture (an "annual duty on all household furniture kept for use, the
value of which.., shall exceed two hundred dollars"), exempting the property of any
charitable, religious, or literary institution. Act of Jan. 18, 1815, § 14, 3 Stat. 186, 190.
45. Corporate Income Tax of 1909, Act of August 9, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112-13.
At the time, income tax bills usually took the form of a minor amendment to a larger tariff
act. PAUL, supra note 42, at 91. For a history of the 1909 Act and of Congressional disin-
clination to pay heed to the Pollock decision, see id. at 90-96. The 1909 measure did not
ultimately follow the model of its unconstitutional predecessor, and it was deemed distin-
guishable (and constitutional) by the Supreme Court in 1911. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220
U.S. 107, 147 (1911).
46. Revenue Act of 1913, Act of October 3, 1913, ch.16, § 2(G), 38 Stat. 172.
47. Whitehead, supra note 7, at 541-42.
48. Colombo, supra note 7, at 845.
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deduction for charitable contributions including contributions to religious
institutions-the precursor to § 170 of the current code.49 This provision,
too, was consistently included in subsequent income tax legislation." The
federal income tax parsonage exclusion (§ 107) dates to the Revenue Act of
1921,51 and has only been modified once.
52
C. The Social Benefit Theory
The most common explanation for religious and charitable tax ex-
emptions in the modem world is the "social benefit" theory, sometimes
labeled the "public benefit theory" or the "quid pro quo theory." The ba-
sic idea is that tax exemption is appropriate because of the "benefit" that
accrues to society by virtue of the organization's activities. In the case of a
church, these benefits accrue by virtue of the church's secular activities
(e.g., its soup kitchen or homeless shelter) and, some maintain, its religious
activities. 3 In one articulation, the value of tax exemption54 is viewed as
49. See Act of August 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556 (1894); Joseph M. Kuzin-
sky, Comment, Section 170, Tax Expenditures, and the First Amendment: The Failure of
Charitable Religious Contributions for the Return of a Religious Benefit, 61 TEMPLE L. REv.
443, 463 & n.130 (1988) (discussing history of§ 170).
50. For instance, when Congress levied a stiff income tax to finance World War I, it
included a charitable contributions deduction expressly to ensure that taxpayers would not
respond to the tax by reducing their charitable deductions. War Revenue Act of 1917, ch.
63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917) (inclusion of deduction); 55 CONG. REc. 6728
(1917) (discussion of need for deduction); Mark L. Geier, Case Note, 13 HAmLTNE L. REV.
433, 444 (1990).
51. Revenue Act of 1921, § 213(b)(1 1), Pub. L. No. 67-98, 42 Stat. 227, 239.
52. Act of August 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 32. The original act allowed a minister
of the gospel to exclude from his taxable income the rental value of his "dwelling house and
appurtenances thereof furnished... as part of his compensation." 42 Stat. 239 (1921). In
1954, the legislature substituted the word "home" for "house" and added an exclusion of
cash housing allowances. The legislative history, which can be found at H.R. REP. No.
1337, S. REP. No. 1622, and CoNF. REP. No. 2543, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4171,
4822, and 5280, suggests the principal author of this latter provision, Representative Mack
of Illinois, perceived this exclusion as a necessary part of the "fight" against Communism.
See Hearings on General Revenue Revision Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
83d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 3 at 1576 (1953) ("Certainly in these times when we are being
threatened by a godless and antireligious world movement we should correct this discrimi-
nation against certain ministers of the gospel who are carrying on such a courageous fight
against this foe. Certainly this is not too much to do for these people."). Ironically, a tax
court 30 years later denied the exclusion to a Baptist minister who preached against Com-
munism, noting as it did so that the "preaching of anticommunism is not a tenet or practice
of the Baptist faith." Colbert v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 449, 452 (1974); see also Foster,
supra note 6, at 151 (history of the parsonage exchision).
53. See Witte, supra note 19, at 386-88. Professor Witte argues that churches provide
"intangible but invaluable" secular benefits through their religious activities. Id.
54. It would be disingenuous to argue that tax exemptions are not of value to the entity
exempted. Clearly a church that pays no property tax or income tax has more of its property
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"compensation" for the cost of performing services that otherwise would
have to be, or simply would be, performed by the government." In another
articulation, the benefit of exemption is deemed appropriate because the
entity provides goods or services that are viewed as socially useful, even
though the government would not itself endeavor to provide them. 6 Alter-
natively, the entity provides goods or services that, although socially use-
ful, the government could not provide--either because it lacks the financial
resources, or because of a legal impediment such as a constraint on its
power to spend.17 In another articulation, the exempt entity's mere exis-
and income at its disposal than if it were required to pay such taxes. "Churches," as Profes-
sor Bittker wrote in 1969, "like any other potential targets of taxation, are better off if the
legislature chooses to tax other groups, or to tax events or activities in which they engage
rarely or not at all." Bittker, supra note 7, at 1304.
55. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 75-1860, at 129 (1938) (Revenue Act of 1938)
(" [E]xemption from taxation of money and property devoted to charitable and other pur-
poses is based upon the theory that Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by
its relief from financial burdens which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations
from other public funds .... "). For a recent case discussing and rejecting the notion of tax
exemption as compensation, see Camps Newfound, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 117 S.
Ct. 1590, 1604-07 (1997) (Stevens, J.) (rejecting argument that Maine property tax exemp-
tion for charitable organizations serving residents was a government "purchase" of charita-
ble services so as to fall within a narrow exception to the dormant commerce clause for
states in the role of market participant); see also id. at 1605 (discussing Walz and the "con-
stitutionally significant difference between subsidies and tax exemptions").
56. Charles 0. Galvin & Neal Devins, A Tax Policy Analysis of Bob Jones University
v. United States, 36 VAND. L. REv. 1353, 1365 (1983). For instance, the legislative history
of the Revenue Act of 1894, which exempted organizations "organized and conducted
solely for charitable, religious, or educational purposes," indicates plainly that the exemp-
tion was included because such organizations were deemed to serve "desirable public pur-
poses." Id. The legislative histories of subsequent federal tax acts contain similar state-
ments. Id. at 1366 (citing 44 CONG. REc. 4147 (1909); 50 CONG. REc. 1305 (1913)).
57. The former (lack of financial resources) can be seen playing a role in the enactment
of tax exemptions in the Revenue Act of 1894. Once the statute is placed in its historical
context (the depression of 1893), comments in the legislative history about churches being
"effective suppliers of public relief' suggest that tax exemption was seen as a way to en-
courage the shifting of certain "public responsibilities" from government to private organi-
zations during a time of economic hardship. Hoff, supra note 34, at 79.
Deductions for charitable contributions, also, have been seen as a way for government
to encourage a shifting of financial responsibility for social welfare from government to
private individuals. See, e.g., 55 CONG. REc. 6714, 6728 (1917) (Sen. Hollis) ("For every
dollar that a man contributes for these public charities, educational, scientific, or otherwise,
the public gets 100 per cent."). The legislative history of the 1938 charitable contributions
deduction confirms that Congress believed it could use the deduction to shift the burden of
supporting charity from the government to voluntary private contributors. See Geier, at
444-45 (" Congress was well aware that allowing taxpayers a charitable contribution deduc-
tion on their federal income tax returns would result in lower collection of tax revenues ....
[However,] Congress believed that financial support from private donors would eliminate
the need for public funds to be used for charitable purposes."); see also H.R. REP. No. 1860,
at 19 (3d Sess. 1938).
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tence is a social good because it contributes to a diversity of viewpoints in
the community.5" Variations on the "social benefit" theme appear
throughout the legislative history of property tax exemptions, income tax
exemptions, the charitable contribution deduction, and the parsonage ex-
clusion, and the theory has been picked up by the courts.59
Woven into the subtext of the social benefit justification is a vague
notion of the exempt entity as an "agent" of the state. This was explicitly
true of established churches in colonial America: when the church was
literally an arm of the state, it made no more sense to tax that church than
to tax the gaol or the courthouse.6 0 And it is implicitly true now, when
supporters of exemptions rely on (or when the legislative history speaks of)
"compensation" for tasks the government chooses not to undertake or is
precluded from undertaking. And when the exempt entity is a church
rather than a charitable institution, the quid pro quo theory turns the Ameri-
can experiment in separation on its head.61
Opponents have argued, however, that this shifting of responsibilities is not economi-
cally efficient-at least not when one is shifting responsibility to a religious organization.
Professor Lashbrooke, for instance, argues that "religious organizations are less efficient on
a cost/benefit analysis than other charitable organizations because a large portion of every
dollar donated to religious organizations is devoted to worship," concluding that "this de-
feats the efficiency rationale for shifting the social welfare burden to the private sector to cut
government overhead and costs." E.C. Lashbrooke, Jr., An Economic and Constitutional
Case for Repeal of the I.RC. Section 170 Deduction for Charitable Contributions to Relig-
ious Organizations, 27 DuQ. L. REv. 695, 703 (1989). Whatever the economic merit of this
point, however, the legislative histories do not suggest that it has won adherents.
58. See, e.g., Slye, supra note 6, at 249 (arguing that government derives an intangible
benefit from fostering diversity).
59. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 588 (1983) ("Tax ex-
emptions for certain institutions thought beneficial to the social order of the country as a
whole, or to a particular community, are deeply rooted in our history, as in that of Eng-
land."); Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924) ("Evidently the [charitable]
exemption is made in recognition of the benefit which the public derives from corporate
activities of the class named, and is intended to aid them when not conducted for private
gain.").
60. Hoff, supra note 34, at 108-09; Witte, supra note 19, at 374-75 (arguing that estab-
lished churches "were discharging the state's responsibility for the established religion" and
that in return "the church corporations received the tax support, tax exemptions, and other
protections and privileges normally afforded to state agencies"); see also Pfeffer, supra note
15, at211l.
61. Professor Laycock, for instance, has argued that an entity fully taking over a state
function (whether dejure or merely de facto) ought to be considered a state actor and ought
to be therefore subject to the various constraints on state actions. "A church," he writes,
"that ... exclusively takes over a state function should become subject to the state's obliga-
tion not to discriminate on the basis of race." Douglas Laycock, Tax Exemptions for Ra-
cially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 60 TEX. L. REV. 259, 275 (1982), (citing Demo-
cratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 126 (1981) (holding that if a political party
effectively commandeers a state's electoral process, it must allow blacks to vote in its pri-
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Income tax exemption of nonprofit organizations (including, there-
fore, religious ones) also makes sense because it is difficult to construct a
workable system for income tax collection that includes these entities.
62
This argument draws compelling support from the observation that a non-
profit organization by definition has rio meaningful "income" in the ordi-
nary sense of the word. Nonprofit organizations are not, and some would
say were never thought to be, "suitable targets" for an income tax.63 The
argument also draws support from the fact that it is difficult to apply some
of the basic concepts of income tax to nonprofit organizations. 6' Are
membership dues paid into a church's coffers "gifts" (and thereby exclud-
able under § 102 of the Internal Revenue Code) or are they business in-
come? 5 Can a "nonprofit" truly have a "business expense" when the
I.R.S. has taken to looking for profit-seeking as an identifying marker of
such expenses?6 While one can work around these conceptual problems,
the basic point is that there is something fundamentally nonsensical about
imposing an "income" tax on an entity that is primarily in the business of
"not making money." 67 As Professor Bittker concluded in 1969, "the very
concept of 'taxable income' for charitable or other public service organiza-
tions is an exotic subject more suited to academic speculation than to prac-
tical administration." 68
mary)).
62. See Boris I. Bittker & Kenneth M. Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitu-
tionalizing" The Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51, 64-65 (1972) (making this argu-
ment about the income tax exemption in § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code).
63. Boris I. Bittker & George K. Radhert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations
from Federal Income Tax, 85 YALE L. J. 299, 304 (1976). Bittker and Radhert argue that in
the early days of the federal income tax, the few lawmakers who commented on the issue or
tried to articulate a theory "suggested that an income tax could appropriately be imposed
only on activities conducted for profit, and that crucial statutory notions like 'net income'
and 'business expenses' do not ring true when applied to nonprofit organizations." Id at
302. Indeed, the principal author of the Revenue Act of 1913 (the first income tax legisla-
tion after the ratification of the sixteenth amendment), Cordell Hull, opposed an explicit
exemption, arguing that the concept of "net income" per se excluded such organizations.
Id. at 303.
64. See generally id. at 307-14 for the examples that follow and for other examples.
65. Section 102 excludes gifts and bequests from taxation. 26 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
The paradox is that nonprofit organizations are "in the business" of soliciting them. See
Bittker, supra note 7, at 1299.
66. See, e.g., Pasternak v. C.I.R., 990 F.2d 893, 898 (6th Cir. 1993); Kartrude v. C.I.R.,
925 F.2d 1379, 1383 (1 1th Cir. 1991); In re Adirondack League Club, 55 T.C. 796, 807-08
(1971).
67. Bittker, supra note 7, at 1299.
68. Id.; see also Bittker & Radhert, supra note 64, at 314; Slye, supra note 6, at 247-48
(nonprofit organizations have no meaningful income); Colombo, supra note 7, at 857-58
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A related point is that one has difficulty conceiving of the appropriate
tax rate for a nonprofit organization.69 The economic burden of a tax on an
organization at the organization level ultimately falls on the organization's
beneficiaries." Accordingly, the organization's income should be imputed
to these individuals, so that they can be taxed indirectly at their own per-
sonal tax rates.71 The ultimate rate for the organization as proxy for its
beneficiaries should be the average of the personal tax rates of those bene-
ficiaries. 72 In the case of a charitable religious organization, "the benefici-
aries are too diffuse for a satisfactory imputation of the group's income to
individuals, and so divergent in economic status that it would be difficult to
establish a fair average rate at which to tax the church as their surrogate."73
Moreover, the church must pass along the cost of the tax in the form of re-
duced distributions to its beneficiaries, of whom the poorest can least af-
ford a reduced handout. In other words, the distribution of the ultimate
"burden" of the tax conflicts with the basic premise of a progressive in-
come tax.
State legislatures and Congress have, since the early days of this
country's history, consistently exempted religious and charitable organiza-
tions from property and income taxes. For the most part, religious exemp-
tions have been granted in the same manner, to the same extent, and for the
same reasons, as charitable exemptions.
II. THE TAX-AND-SPEND PRINCIPLE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The prevalence of established churches in colonial America and the
history of the disestablishment movement in the 1780s and 1790s suggest
that the Establishment Clause was meant to do at least two things: to pro-
hibit the federal government from interfering with state establishment or
(explaining that income tax exemption is justified by its proponents as a "natural outgrowth
of the inability to accurately measure the income of nonprofit organizations or to assess the
incidence of tax that would occur if exemption were not available"). Colombo argues,
however, that at present many nonprofit organizations (hospitals and universities more often
than churches) do, in fact, operate very much like businesses. Colombo, supra note 8, at
859-60.
69. See Bittker, supra note 6, at 1290; Bittker & Radhert, supra note 63, at 305; Co-
lombo, supra note 7, at 859.
70. Bittker & Radhert, supra note 63, at 315.
71. Id. In the case of a religious organization, of course, many of these individuals fall
below the minimum tax level, and their shares would be "zero." Bittker, supra note 7, at
1290.
72. Bittker & Radhert, supra note 63, at 315.
73. Id.
74. Id This is the case unless the higher tax rates prompt the benefactors of the church
to increase their gift giving.
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disestablishment of religion and to prohibit the federal government from
coercing support of religion in the form of taxation and subsequent dis-
bursement of those tax dollars to religion. It follows from both that the
Establishment Clause was designed to protect religious liberty just as much
as was the Free Exercise Clause-which of course is consistent with the
notion that "separation" protects both religious liberty and the state.
Thefirst principle, a federalist interpretation of the clause, draws sup-
port from the fact that so many colonies did have some sort of established
religion at the time of the clause's ratification and the fact that the exact
arrangement varied from colony to colony. The constitution obviously
does not give Congress any affirmative power to interfere in such matters;
the powers enumerated in Article I do not include any power in the matter
of religion or state establishment of religion.75 The notion is that the clause
was in part a response to forces-both anti-establishment and anti-
disestablishment-that desired memorialization of this fact. Once wran-
gling over the drafts was completed, convention delegates were left with a
provision prohibiting Congress from making any law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion-i.e., any law concerning, on the topic of, perhaps
even affecting (or tending to preclude, or tending to interfere with) estab-
lishment of religion by the states.76 If this interpretation is correct, then the
clause standing alone would appear to prohibit the federal government
from interfering with a state government's decision to do exactly what
Madison (as explained below) deplored-tax a man for the support of re-
ligion. The application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the clause as thus
interpreted presents something of a paradox. If the clause prohibits Con-
gress from interfering with state decisions to establish or disestablish
churches, it is conceptually troublesome to view this precept as now
"similarly applicable" to the states. Whose decision (to establish or dises-
tablish) is the state now, itself, similarly, forbidden to disrupt? And be-
cause section five of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power
to enforce this new "prohibition" on the states, the Fourteenth Amendment
would now appear to permit Congress to do exactly what the First
Amendment forbids it to do--enact a law respecting religion (it is thus
entirely possible that the civil war amendments were not meant to disrupt
the balance of power embodied in the First Amendment).77 This view of
75. See U.S. CONST. art. 1.
76. See Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 2356 (making the argument); id. at n.62 (noting
others who make the argument).
77. See id. at 2376-77; Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution:
An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 N.D. L. REV. 311,
317-18 (1986). One might note in connection with this point that neither the original Bill of
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the clause has been consigned to the scrap heap of historical could-have-
beens, but particularly since much taxation and exemption of churches oc-
curs at the state and local level, it is worthy of renewed attention.
The second principle, the tax-and-spend principle, has been thor-
oughly and unquestioningly adopted, in one form or another, by court and
commentator alike. 8 It draws particular support from the experience of
disestablishment in Virginia in the 1780s.
A. The Virginia Experience
Virginia was, at the time, predominantly Anglican,79 that church hav-
ing been supported by taxes collected from all citizens of the state, whether
Anglican or dissenting, for some time. ° After the revolution, the state be-
gan gradually to reduce the Anglican Church's dominance and to provide
for religious liberty."1 Thus, for instance, in 1776 the state legislature dis-
established the Anglican Church, at the urging of the Presbyters, decreeing
Rights nor the Fourteenth Amendment has ever been thought to bind the Indian tribes in
their capacity as sovereigns; that is to say, conventional wisdom holds that the Indian tribes
are not "constitutionally" prohibited from, e.g., requiring self-incrimination in tribal court
or searching and seizing private property at will. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49, 55-58 (1978); see generally FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
664-70 (1982 ed.). In 1968, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§
1301-41, which imposes the Bill of Rights, clause by clause, on the Indian Tribes in their
management of their internal affairs. Section 1302, the First Amendment equivalent, does
not include an Establishment Clause. See also Rodney K. Smith, Sovereignty and the Sa-
cred: The Establishment Clause in Indian Country, 56 MONT. L. REv. 295, 298 (1995)
(containing a brief policy-based argument that the principles of the Establishment Clause
should not apply in Indian country).
78. See Jesse H. Chopper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56
CAL. L. REv. 260, 267 (1968) (" [T]he Establishment Clause sought to protect taxpayers
from being forced by the federal government to support religion."); id at 268 ("Whatever
other historical bases for the establishment ban, it is beyond reasonable dispute that it pur-
ported to secure religious liberty, in particular by prohibiting taxation for religious pur-
poses.").
79. I DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 125 (Commager & Cantor, eds., 10th ed.,
1988).
80. The Anglican Church in Virginia was also privileged in other ways in the century
leading up to the revolution; it had, for instance, the exclusive right to perform weddings
and funerals (and to collect fees for doing so), and dissenters were largely disqualified from
holding public office. See WEBER& GILBERT, supra note 15, at 8-10.
81. Thus, for instance, article 16 of the VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, drafted in
1776, provided that "the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging
it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force and violence." VA. DECL. OF
RIGHTS art. 16 (1776) (emphasis added). The committee of Virginia convention delegates
convened to compose this document included George Mason, who produced the first draft
of article 16, Patrick Henry, and James Madison, who is responsible for the amendment that
added the language emphasized. RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 68-73
(1990).
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that "all dissenters.., shall.., be totally free and exempt from all levies,
taxes, and impositions whatever supporting and maintaining the [Anglican]
Church," and simultaneously relieving Anglicans from those same taxes.8 2
Adequate public support for an assessment in favor of religion re-
mained for Patrick Henry to present to the legislature "A Bill Establishing
A Provision For Teachers of The Christian Religion." 83 Pursuant to this
bill, each Virginian would have paid a moderate tax to the state for the sup-
port of teachers of the Christian religion, designating the church-or even a
"seminary of learning"-to which his tax dollars would flow. 4  In re-
sponse, James Madison penned his "Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments," which then circulated throughout the state during
the summer of 1785, before the final vote on Henry's bill.85
Madison argued that it is fundamentally wrong for civil authority to
use its coercive powers to take a person's money for the support of a
church-even to take a mere pittance for that purpose.86 "[I]t is proper,"
he wrote, "to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties .... [T]he
same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of
his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to
conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever." 7 A legisla-
82. IX Statutes at Large of Virginia 164 (Henning, ed.). Specifically, in 1776 lawmak-
ers exempted dissenters from payment of the "ministerial tax" for the benefit of the Angli-
can church. Simultaneously, and apparently partly in response to the prospect of Anglicans
pretending to be dissenters in order to avoid payment of that tax, the legislators suspended
collection of the tax altogether until the next year. That suspension was renewed, yearly,
until the tax was eliminated in 1779. E.g., id. at 312, 469, 579; see CURRv, supra note 23, at
134-48; see also LEvY, supra note 24, at 63; MARVIN MEYERS, THm MIND OF THE FOUNDER:
SouRcEs OF THE PoLITcAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 6 (1973); Weber & Gilbert, supra
note 15, at 11. See KETCHAM, supra note 81, at 75-76, for an overview of the Presbyterian
and other petitions received by the House of Delegates in 1776, requesting the disestablish-
ment of the Anglican church.
83. LEVY, supra note 24, at 61-62.
84. WEBER & GILBERT, supra note 15, at 11-12. Supporters of the bill included
Washington and Marshall. COBB, supra note 22, at 495. The bill is reproduced in its en-
tirety in the Supplemental Appendix to Justice Rutledge's dissent in the Everson case.
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 72-74 (1947). Henry's position on "establishment"
is more complicated than his support of the assessments bill suggests. Nearly a decade ear-
lier, during the drafting of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, Henry introduced a proposed
amendment to article 16 (albeit drafted by Madison) that would have disestablished the
Anglican Church-in the sense of eliminating its privileges and emoluments. The amend-
ment was rejected. CURRY, supra, at 135; KETCHAM, supra note 81, at 68-73; see also
Everson, 330 U.S. at I1 n.10.
85. LEvY, supra note 24, at 63; MEYERS, supra note 82, at 6.
86. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance M 1-9 (1785), reprinted in MEYERS,
supra note 82, at 6-13.
87. Id. 3, at 8.
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ture which may establish one church today may establish another tomor-
row;88 because the sphere of religion is necessarily separate from the civil
sphere--even, in Madison's words, "exempt from its cognizance" 9 -such
a power in the legislature would be tyrannical. 90 Quoting the Virginia
Declaration of Rights, Madison noted that man must be left to his own re-
lationship with "the Creator," and to his own sense of what religion de-
mands of him.91 The point, Madison argued, is that "the Religion... of
every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man,"
that this "unalienable right" is personal, private, and cannot be "abridged
by the institution of Civil Society."92 The view of civil authority embodied
in the assessments bill would have contravened the mutual respect, equal-
ity, and tolerance, by which the new country defined itself.93
In October, when the state legislature met, the religious assessments
bill died without a formal vote.94 In its stead, due in part to the arrival of
signed copies of Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, Thomas Jeffer-
son's "Act For Establishing Religious Freedom"-which had been re-
jected by the Virginia assembly in 1779 95-- was passed, by the House in
1785 and by the Senate in 1786.96 This bill was of a piece with Madison's
petition. "[T]o compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical," the
preamble warned.97 So, too, "even the forcing [of] him to support this or
that teacher of his own religious persuasion." 98 Thus it was "enacted by
the General Assembly, that no man shall be compelled to frequent or sup-
88. Id.
89. Id. 1, at 7.
90. Id. 2, at 7-8.
91. Id. , at 7.
92. Id.
93. Id. 9, at 10-11 (" [T]he proposed establishment is a departure from that generous
policy, which, offering an asylum to the persecuted and oppressed of every Nation and Re-
ligion, promised a lustre to our country, and an accession to the number of its citizens.").
Additionally, noted Madison, Henry's proposal was neither necessary for religion, id. 6, at
9, nor necessary for civil government id. 8, at 10, and it threatened to foster political dis-
cord, id. 1 1, at 11.
94. MEYERS, supra note 82, at 6.
95. CURRY, supra note 23, at 139.
96. MEYERS, supra note 82, at 6; I DOCuMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 79,
at 125. By the time Jefferson's bill was presented to the House, Henry had become Gover-
nor and Jefferson had himself gone to Paris. See generally Peck, supra note 15, at 1130-34.
Curry points out that a multitude of other petitions in opposition to the bill were also sub-
mitted to the legislature and argues that Madison's was not the most influential of the lot.
CURRY, supra note 23, at 143-44.
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port any religious worship, place or ministry whatsoever." 99
There is, thus, considerable support for the proposition that Madison
and Jefferson opposed vigorously the practice whereby civil authority taxes
a citizen for the forcible support of a church, whether or not a church of the
taxpayer's choosing. 1"° Disestablishment in Virginia-i.e., the Madisonian
model of state disestablishment-involved rejection of forcible aid for any
church, even for "all churches" (as in the model of the Henry bill). There
is also considerable support for the proposition that in drafting the Estab-
lishment Clause-and a parallel, but not identical provision that would
have applied to the states-Madison meant to embody exactly this princi-
ple, that civil authority may not tax its constituents and disburse those tax
dollars in support of religion, even if non-preferentially. 01
Thus conceived, the Establishment Clause constrains Congress's ex-
ercise of its powers to tax and spend.'0 2 This is precisely the view of the
99. Id. § 2 (emphasis added).
100. Madison and Jefferson were of course not the first to voice opposition to the col-
lection of taxes for the support of the ministry. Pamphlets arguing that such levies were
"immoral" and "contrary to justice" date in the colonies to at least the 1640s. See COBB,
supra note 22, at 170.
101. Madison introduced the prototype religion clauses to the Congress on June 8,
1787. In Section 9 of Article I, between Clauses 3 and 4, was to be placed a self-executing
provision applicable to Congress, that "The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account
of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the
full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or in any pretext, infringed." In Sec-
tion 10 of Article I, between Clauses I and 2, was to be placed the provision that "No state
shall ... violate the equal rights of conscience." I Annals of Congress at 450-52. The state
provision did not contain a non-establishment provision. See also WEBER & GILBERT, supra
note 15, at 15. The provision applicable to the states was approved in the House but re-
jected by the Senate. LEvY, supra note 24, at 147. For a detailed argument that the framers
of the clause did not intend to permit non-preferential direct aid, using various considered
drafts of the clause, see Douglas Laycock, "Non-preferential" Aid to Religion: A False
Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 875, 875-83 (1985). Professor Levy
also rejects the merely non-preferentialist interpretation of the clause (i.e., the notion that
"establishment" means only "aid to one chosen religion to the exclusion of others") in part
because so many state establishments were non-preferential. See LEVY, supra note 24, at 8-
12, 29, 76-77.
102. This is true no matter what position one takes on the scope of Congress's power to
spend, whether or not one takes Madison's view that the power to spend for the general
welfare amounts to no more than a reference to the more specific powers enumerated in the
subsequent clauses. The alternative view, that the general welfare clause confers a spending
power separate and distinct from (and broader than) the enumerated legislative powers in
Section 8 is largely a fait accompli as a matter of federal constitutional law, see United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64-65 (1936), but it continues to gamer considerable academic
criticism. The dearth ofjudicial decisions on the scope of the spending power is, of course,
attributable to the general ban on taxpayer standing, see Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447, 481-82 (1923), but the exception carved thereto by the Court in Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 85 (1968) makes it quite clear that the Establishment Clause constitutes an express
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Establishment Clause taken by the Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of
Education, although the Court additionally assumed that the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment meant the prohibitions of the First Amend-
ment's Establishment Clause apply identically to the states."0 3 "This Court
has previously recognized," Justice Black wrote, "that the provisions of
the First Amendment, in the drafting of which Madison and Jefferson
played such leading roles, had the same objective and were intended to
provide the same protection against governmental intrusion on religious
liberty as the Virginia statute."' 04 Then follows the oft-quoted paragraph
declaiming what it is, at the very least, the Establishment Clause means-
including that "No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion."'0 5
Although the Everson dissenters took issue with Justice Black's application
of the principle to the facts before the Court that day, every member of the
Court agreed with his explication of the Establishment Clause's meaning
limitation on the power of Congress to spend. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 104 (The Establish-
ment Clause "operates as a specific constitutional limitation upon the exercise by Congress
of the taxing and spending power conferred by Art. I, § 8.").
103. 330 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1947) ("The meaning and scope of the First Amendment, pre-
venting establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, in the light of its
history and the evils it was designed forever to suppress, have been several times elaborated
by the decisions of this Court prior to the application of the First Amendment to the states
by the Fourteenth. The broad meaning given the Amendment by these earlier cases has
been accepted by this Court in its decisions concerning an individual's religious freedom
rendered since the Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted to make the prohibitions of the
First applicable to state action abridging religious freedom. There is every reason to give
the same application and broad interpretation to the 'establishment of religion' clause.");
see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ("The First Amendment de-
clares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the
states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws."). It is, however, arguable that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not mean to apply this concept identically in every way to the
states. This argument draws support from the 1876 rejection of the "Blaine Amendment"
which would have provided, among other things, that "No State shall make any law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." H.R.J. Res.
1, 44th Cong. (Ist Sess. 1876). The Amendment passed in the House of Representatives
(180 to 98), but failed in the Senate (28 in favor, 16 opposed, and 27 not voting) and was
thus never submitted to the states for ratification. 4 CoNG. REc. 5190, 5453 (1876) (House
and Senate votes, respectively); see CORD, supra note 22, at 162. The temporal proximity of
this amendment's proposal to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment strongly sug-
gests the Fourteenth Amendment was not viewed (by those who passed it in Congress and
presented it to the states) as applying the First Amendment's Establishment Clause to the
states. See, e.g., LEvY, supra note 17, at 148.
104. 330 U.S. at 13 (citing Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890)); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 679, 728
(1871).
105. 330 U.S. at 15-16.
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agreed with his explication of the Establishment Clause's meaning and his
evocation of Virginia's disestablishment experience.
B. Direct Aid and Subsidies
Religious property and income tax exemptions do not violate the tax-
and-spend prohibition articulated in Everson. If a municipal government
levies a property tax and refrains from collecting that tax from certain enti-
ties or people (the local hospital, the local church, the local legal aid clinic,
and families in rented housing), it is ipso facto not handing them a check
(especially not one composed of monies coercively levied from others)."°
Thus with respect to the question whether a tax exemption is "direct
aid" -whether a tax exemption is a violation of the "tax-and-spend" pro-
hibition-plainly it is not." 7 This is precisely the conclusion drawn by the
Court in Walz where the Court held that a city property tax exemption
scheme did not run afoul of the tax-and-spend prohibition because it did
not involve an actual transfer of funds." 8 The Court wrote, "The grant of a
tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does not transfer
part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the
church support the state." 109
106. See DEAN KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES SHOULD NOT PAY TAXEs 70 (1977) (" [Tlax
exemption, in and of itself, conveys no money whatever to an organization, which cannot
build a birdhouse or buy a bathmat with it. The only money such an organization has is
what its supporters contribute to it because they believe in it. All that a tax exemption does
[is] to permit the full value of such contributions to go to the purposes intended without
diversion to the government .... No one is compelled by tax exemption to support the
organization, as they would be by taxation and appropriation."); Donald A. Gianella, Re-
ligious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, 81 HARv. L. REv. 513, 533
(1968).
107. This is even clearer when one tries to imagine a suitable plaintiff to challenge
such an exemption. Plainly a taxpayer would not have standing under the Flast exception to
the Frothingham ban on taxpayer suits which permits a taxpayer to challenge a congres-
sional exercise of the spending power on the ground that it violates the Establishment
Clause (because that clause is a specific restraint on that power). There is simply no expen-
diture to identify and challenge. Cf United States Catholic Conf. v. Baker, 885 F.2d 1020,
1031 (2d Cir. 1989) (denying standing to taxpayer plaintiffs challenging 501(c)(3) exemp-
tion for church on ground that church violated proscription on political activity). This
makes it clear that an exemption is not a direct expenditure. This is not to say, of course,
that no plaintiff would have standing. A proper plaintiff might be one, for instance, who
complained of being similarly situated and yet differently treated (e.g., because he himself
was not tax exempt) in violation of a First and/or Fifth amendment guarantee of equal pro-
tection.
108. 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970).
109. Id. at 675. The "actual transfer of funds" principle adopted by Walz has been
criticized as overly formalistic. See Donna D. Adler, The Internal Revenue Code, The Con-
stitution, and the Courts: The Use of Tax Expenditure Analysis in Judicial Decision Making,
28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 855, 888 (1993). But of course it is beyond dispute that the para-
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1. "Subsidy" Rhetoric
This aspect of Walz-the proposition that an exemption is nothing
more than failure to collect a tax and that there is something different about
direct cash handouts-has come under fire in the last thirty years."' In-
deed, it is now commonplace for judges and scholars to treat tax exemp-
tions as privileges, benefits, or even gifts from the legislature. Professor
Bittker became alarmed by this trend thirty years ago, warning that "once
this characterization is accepted, it is only a short step to such pejoratives
as 'loophole,' 'preference' and 'subsidy."' ' " Precisely what he warned of
has come to pass. The word "subsidy" has crept into our day-to-day char-
acterization of tax exemptions."' And it is only a short step further-one
that some have already taken-to the proposition that "giving" a church
such a "subsidy" is for all intents and purposes the same as handing a cash
disbursement to the church and, thus, just as unconstitutional under the Es-
tablishment Clause."13
digmatic constitutional violation involves coercive taxation and cash disbursement. See id;
see also Matthew S. Steffey, Redefining the Modern Constraints of the Establishment
Clause: Separable Principles of Equality, Subsidy, Endorsement, and Church Autonomy, 75
MARQ. L. REv. 903, 918 (1992). An actual transfer of funds is additionally fraught with
symbolism of government approval repugnant to the Establishment Clause. See Develop-
ments in the Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1675, 1692 (1987) ("af-
firmative governmental support for religion sends a stronger message of symbolic endorse-
ment"); id. (suggesting the benefit of a tax exemption "is less obvious because the
interposition of the complex state tax-collecting apparatus attenuates the appearance of gov-
ernment support").
110. Although the decision was 7 to 1, the vote on this particular point was 6 to 2, Jus-
tice Harlan noting in his concurrence that he agreed with the dissent that "a tax exemption is
a subsidy." See Walz, 397 U.S. at 704 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 699 (Harlan, J., con-
curring).
111. Bittker, supra note 6, at 1290.
112. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 404-09 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(joined by Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.) (discussing Minnesota tax deduction for
educational expenses) ("The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits a State
from subsidizing religious education, whether it does so directly or indirectly .... By tak-
ing this deduction, a taxpayer reduces his tax bill by a sum equal to the amount of tuition
multiplied by his tax bill .... By ensuring that parents will be reimbursed for tuition pay-
ments they make, the Minnesota statute requires that taxpayers in general pay for the cost of
parochial education .... []t makes no difference whether the qualifying 'parent receives an
actual cash payment [or] is allowed to reduce... the sum he would otherwise be obliged to
pay over to the State.' The statute is little more than a subsidy of tuition masquerading as a
subsidy of general educational expenses.") (emphasis added); Taxation with Representation
v. Regan, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) ("Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form
of subsidy that is administered through the tax system.") (emphasis added) (suggesting that
income tax exemptions for groups that engage in political lobbying amount to paying for the
lobbying with public money).
113. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 404-09.
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2. Tax Expenditure Analysis
The source of the tendency now to characterize an "exemption" as a
"subsidy" is tax expenditure analysis. Tax expenditure analysis begins
with the proposition that the statutory provisions making up a tax code con-
sist of two sorts: first, baseline provisions that effect the revenue raising
(e.g., those establishing the tax base, setting up an accounting period, de-
fining taxable units, and laying out a rate schedule), and second, everything
else (i.e., provisions that permit or define deviations from the baseline).' 14
All provisions in a tax code, it is said, are either one or the other; "[one]
part provides a structure for the raising of revenues, and the other part car-
ries out social and economic goals." 115 The general idea is that there is
some sort of identifiable nortnative tax, and any provision not essential to
establishing its normative attributes is "really" a reflection of social and
economic policy. Tax expenditure theorists posit that provisions of the tax
code that "really" carry out social and economic policy goals should be
considered the equivalent of direct spending decisions. As explained by
Professor Adler, granting a taxpayer an exemption from a tax that would
otherwise accrue (i.e., from the "normative tax") is the same-in purpose
and in effect-as collecting that tax and giving the taxpayer a direct sub-
sidy.116 Hence these provisions are called "tax expenditures." 7
114. STANLEY SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 6 (1973).
115. Adler, supra note 109, at 860.
116. Id., at 858; STANLEY SURREY & PAUL MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 25 (1985).
With respect to charitable deductions, the argument is made that the government provides a
subsidy to the charity in question. Thus, to borrow an example from Professor Adler, sup-
pose that a taxpayer donates $100 to the Salvation Army and that the tax code permits him
then to deduct $100 from his taxable income. (Assume he itemizes). If the taxpayer is in
the 31% tax bracket, the net result is that he will pay $31 fewer in taxes to the government.
Tax expenditure analysis posits that, by foregoing the $31 in revenue, the government ef-
fectively provides $31 (of the $100 donation) to the Salvation Army. See Adler, supra note
109, at 858. The private choice of the individual is deemed irrelevant, as is the fact that the
government's only "contribution" is in agreeing to forgo a corresponding amount in income
tax. Tax expenditure theorists would apply the same analysis to generally applicable tax
credits for donations to (all) private schools. A recent and even more attenuated example
can be found in Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 613 (Ariz. 1999), in which the Arizona
Supreme Court correctly sustained a state tax credit of $500 for persons who donate to pri-
mary or secondary school educational scholarships. "Arizona's statute provides multiple
layers of private choice," the court wrote. Id. at 614. "Important decisions are made by
two distinct sets of beneficiaries-tax payers taking the credit and parents applying for
scholarship aid in sending their children to tuition-charging institutions .... [S]chools are
no more than indirect recipients of taxpayer contributions. .. ." Id. An interesting contrast
would be tuition grants made generally available without regard to the nature of the institu-
tion attended. See, e.g., Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489
(1986) (allowing state to issue vocational tuition grant to blind student so he could attend a
Christian college and possibly become a pastor). In such a situation, the private individual
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The theory is not new,"l' but its use as a budgetary tool by the federal
government is a development of the last twenty-five years, and is largely
due to the work of Professor Surrey, who not only taught the theory to sev-
eral generations of Harvard students, but wrote about it extensively and
argued for its adoption when serving as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
in the Johnson Administration." 9 The Congressional Budget Act of 1974
made the concept of tax expenditures an integral part of the annual federal
budget process. 120 "Tax expenditures" are now defined by law as "those
revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which al-
low a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or
which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax
liability." 121 It is now mandated by federal statute that both the budget
submitted to Congress by the President 122 and the report accompanying the
(Congressional) concurrent resolution on the budget123 include a "tax ex-
penditure budget," which is defined as an "enumeration" of tax expendi-
tures. 124  The Office of Management and Budget publishes the annual
budget, each year, and includes therein its own tax expenditure analysis.
Professor Surrey's goal, in arguing for the characterization of tax ex-
emptions as tax expenditures and in creating the tax expenditure budget,
was two-fold: it was to draw attention to policy decisions he believed to be
embedded in the tax code, 25 and it was to ensure that "tax expenditures"
would be subjected to the same policy analysis as their corollary spending
decisions (e.g., by the government agencies ordinarily responsible for the
equivalent cash outlay).126 The argument for public disclosure is self ex-
has a choice-a choice of where to direct the government's "handout" from taxpayer
money. This arrangement more closely parallels Patrick Henry's assessment bill and is
equally offensive to the tax-and-spend principle. Notwithstanding the distinction between
such schemes, the recent opinion in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) suggested the
Witters arrangement is "no different from a State's issuing a paycheck to one of its employ-
ees, knowing that the employee would donate part or all of the check to a religious institu-
tion." Id. at 226.
117. See Lashbrooke, supra note 57, at 697.
118. For an overview of the history of tax expenditure analysis, see id., at 698.
119. See Adler, supra note 109, at 861 & n.21.
120. Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified in
scattered sections of the U.S.C. including Title 2 and Title 31).
121. 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (1994).
122. 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(16) (1994).
123. 2 U.S.C. § 632(e)(2)(E) (1994).
124. 2 U.S.C. § 622(3).
125. See Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L. J. 1155,
1158, 1181.
126. See, e.g., SURREY, supra note 114, at 40 (" Governmental financial assistance, if
made available through the income tax, should be viewed and judged in the same manner as
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planatory. The argument for shifting the locus of policy evaluation is
premised on the notion that the organs of government ordinarily responsi-
ble for direct expenditures are better equipped than congressional tax-
writers and the Department of the Treasury-by virtue of their substantive
expertise-to make "expenditure" decisions.1
27
3. Critiques of Tax Expenditure Analysis
Tax expenditure theory has been heavily criticized in the last thirty
years, and the criticism begins with the very assumption the theory makes
about the proper relationship between citizen and government. Implicit in
Surrey's work-implicit in labeling an exemption a "subsidy" -is a pre-
sumption that the fruits of a person's labor "naturally" belong to the gov-
ernment, and that each time the government refrains from taking a portion
of his income, it is choosing not to take something that is "rightfully" the
government's for the mere asking. 2 ' But, simply put, the money that he
earns and the property that he owns do not "by nature" belong to the gov-
ernment. 29 And when we focus our attention on decisions not to tax, when
direct assistance."); id. at 50-60. For a restatement of this argument, see Adler, supra note
109, at 856 (complaining that through the device of tax expenditures the government spends
billions of dollars each year without oversight or scrutiny).
127. See SURREY, supra note 114, at 141-46. For a detailed discussion and critique of
Surrey's argument for the substantive expertise of non-tax institutions, see Edward A. Ze-
linksy, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax
Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L. J. 1165 (1993). Professor Zelinsky argues,
for instance, that the tax process through the Ways and Means Committee is more pluralistic
than an expert-oriented career civil service non-tax agency that can be captured by narrow
interest groups and limited constituencies. See id. at 1176. Surrey's conviction that placing
tax "expenditures" in the hands of specialized government agencies would enhance both
efficiency and professionalism ultimately amounts to a conviction that government can be
best managed by a civil service system of experts-a view of government firmly rooted in
the legacy of the New Deal and progressivism. Id. at 1170.
128. For a variation of this argument, see Galvin & Devins, supra note 56, at 1370.
See also Irving Kristol, Taxes, Property, and Equality, 37 PUB. INT. L. J. 3, 14-15 (1974).
For an interesting counter-example involving creditors (i.e., in a very different posture from
the government), see Daniel Keating, Bankruptcy, Tithing, and the Pocket-Picking Para-
digm of Free Exercise, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 1041, 1043 n.9 (asking, but not answering,
"whether allowing a debtor to tithe in bankruptcy amounts to forcing unsecured creditors to
subsidize the debtor's religion" in violation of the Establishment Clause) (emphasis added).
In recent years, a considerable number of courts have ordered churches to return to creditors
tithes paid by bankrupt debtors. See, e.g., Kate Thomas, Court Tells Church to Return
Tithes, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 29, 1997 at A8 (noting Texas trial court ruling in favor of air con-
ditioning company against local baptist church) (not relying on Establishment Clause).
129. See Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 618 (rejecting argument that "because taxpayer
money could enter the treasury if it were not excluded by way of the tax credit," it is public
money that cannot be used to support a religious establishment) (" [F]unds remain in the
taxpayer's ownership at least until final calculation of the amount actually owed to the gov-
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we demand item-by-item justification for every decision not to tax, we can
lose sight of this fact, and of the fact that the government's primary burden
is that ofjustifying each time it chooses to take a person's money. The use
of the word "subsidy" for tax exemptions subtly but inexorably shifts the
focus of the discussion away from the more fundamental question-why
the government claims any portion of our income in the first place, and
how it proposes to spend it. In short, the use of the word "subsidy" for tax
exemptions effectively ratifies an assumption that there is nothing remark-
able about the government's claim on private property.
A less abstract criticism of tax expenditure analysis is that there is no
way to tax everything. In Professor Bittker's words, a legislature "no
matter how avid for revenue, can do no more than pick out from the uni-
verse of people, entities, and events over which it has jurisdiction those
that, in its view, are appropriate objects of taxation." 130 The nature of the
legislative task, in short, is to choose what is within the scope of the tax,
and what is not. "In specifying the ambit of any tax," he wrote, "the leg-
islature cannot avoid 'exempting' those persons, events, activities, or enti-
ties that are outside the territory of the proposed tax." "I
Similarly, there is often no principled way to distinguish between an
exemption carved out of a code, and a code-level redefinition of what is
taxable in the first instance. Take, for example, the fact that nonprofit or-
ganizations are immune from taxation. This immunity, Professor Bittker
noted, "is conferred by a statutory provision that is labeled 'exemption
from taxation,' but"-and here is the key--" substantially the same result
could have been achieved without using the term 'exemption,' by rephras-
ing the statutory language to provide that 'the income of organizations con-
ducted for profit and of natural persons shall be taxed."" 132 Immunity from
taxation written in the form of exemptions and credits may merely reflect a
legislative choice to omit certain transactions, entities, or activities from the
tax base.13
3
The most forceful objection to tax expenditure analysis, however, is
emment.").
130. Bittker, supra note 6, at 1288.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1288-89.
133. See Galvin & Devins, supra note 56, at 1369; see also Zelinsky, supra note 127,
at 1165-66 (classification of a particular feature as normative or subsidizing "cannot always
be made with confidence"). Some would characterize the deduction for charitable contri-
butions and the deduction for medical expenses, for instance, as a refinement in our notion
of what is properly "income" in the first place. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal
Deductions In An Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 331-75 (1972); see also
Thuronyi, supra note 125, at 1167.
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one that Professor Sirrey himself spent a considerable amount of energy
addressing-it is an objection to the notion that there even exists an objec-
tive identifiable "ideal tax," deviations from which would constitute tax
expenditures.1 4 It is the argument that there is no normative income tax
and that Surrey's own efforts to define it more than adequately prove its
inherent subjectivity." 5
Surrey began with the Haig-Simons definition of income-an indi-
vidual's consumption plus the change in his net worth over the period in
question. 6 It would have been both administratively burdensome and
conceptually problematic for Surrey to stop here, as Professor Thuronyi
points out, and define the normative income tax as one of income in the
Haig-Simons sense.3 7 Not only, for instance, is "consumption" not self-
defining, but administration would require annual appraisal of each tax-
payer's assets. 3 ' Accordingly, Surrey used Haig-Simons only as a starting
point.'39 Haig-Simons was then refined in ways Surrey argued were defen-
sible and objective-ways that took into account, for example, the histori-
cal treatment of certain items, the political and administrative realities of
tax administration, and the needs of modem methods of accounting. 140
And of course, almost immediately, reasonable minds will begin to differ.
Professor Andrews would not consider medical expense deductions or
charitable contribution deductions tax expenditures.'4 ' Professor Thuronyi,
pointing out that departure from an "arbitrary norm can be viewed not as
disguised spending, but as an expression of an alternative norm," 142 might
not count business expense deductions as tax expenditures. 14  Professor
Bittker suggested the normative income tax could be a "tax on income that
134. Thuronyi, supra note 125, at 1163-70.
135. A detailed discussion of this problem can be found in Thuronyi, supra note 125,
at 1163-70.
136. Id. at 1164.
137. Id. at 1164-65.
138. Id. Additionally, as Thuronyi points out, Surrey "intended the list of tax expen-
ditures to serve at least in part as a realistic 'hit list' for reform." Id. Naturally,
"[i]dentifying all departures from the Haig-Simons definition as tax expenditures would
have been overbroad and ineffective, implicitly advocating reforms that would be adminis-
tratively infeasible or politically untenable." Id.
139. Id.
140. See SURREY, supra note 114, at 12 (advising that one look to deviations "from
widely accepted definitions of income and standards of business accounting and from the
generally accepted structure of an income tax"); id. at 16-19 (that the normative model of an
income tax necessarily reflects policy-like choices by society that have somehow over time
become structural); see also Thuronyi, supra note 125, at 1165-66.
141. See supra note 133.
142. Thuronyi, supra note 125, at 1170.
143. Id. at 1164 n.55.
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inures in measurable [sic] amounts to the direct or indirect personal benefit
of identifiable natural persons," 144 and that, accordingly, exemption for
non-profits in Title 26 might simply reflect a Congressional realization that
money received by non-profit organizations is outside the basic concept of
the income tax. 45 In short, as Bittker wrote in 1969, the case for tax ex-
penditure analysis "presupposes a consensus on the 'proper' ambit of a
tax." 146
4. Some Implications of Subsidy Rhetoric
If one accepts the Surrey notion that an exemption is tantamount to a
direct subsidy, then one must give thought to the various statutory and con-
stitutional restrictions that attach to federal funding and federal subsidies. 147
The Civil Rights Act, for instance, prohibits racial discrimination by any
program "receiving" federal financial assistance. 48 If tax exemption is
tantamount to direct subsidy, then arguably the strictures of the Civil
Rights Act apply to entities that are tax exempt. For that matter, when the
government supports or encourages private discrimination, that private dis-
crimination can sometimes be imputed to it by virtue of the state action
doctrine, such that it may be found to have violated the equal protection
clause. Might a tax exemption (" subsidy") constitute such encouragement
and assistance?
The lower court decision of McGlotten v. Connally, which concerned
the federal tax status of the Elks Lodge, demonstrates this implication of
tax expenditure analysis.14 9 The three-judge federal district court panel in
McGlotten adopted Professor Surrey's approach, taking the position that
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that can be explained as "pure tax
policy" are not aid (for either statutory or constitutional purposes), and that
144. Bittker, supra note 6, at 1290-91.
145. Id. at 1291.
146. Id. at 1296. The debate between proponents and opponents of tax expenditure
analysis has largely been fought in the context of the income tax, although the points made
translate equivalently into the context of the property tax. See SURREY, supra note 114, at
26-27 ("ab initio all forms of real property should be assessed in the same way and taxed at
the same rate"). Although Surrey did not belabor the point, others have argued for the ap-
plication of tax expenditure analysis to property tax schemes, see, e.g., Colombo, supra note
7, at 858, and pointed out that in this context there will be far less disagreement about the
scope of the normative tax, see Witte, supra, note 19, at 385 n.78.
147. See generally SURREY& MCDANIEL, supra note 116, at 118-55.
148. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994) ("No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance.").
149. 338 F. Supp. 448, 457-58 (D.D.C. 1972).
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provisions which cannot be thus explained essentially operate as subsi-
dies. 50 Relying on the premise that the government allows the deduction
of charitable contributions in order to relieve itself of the burden of meeting
public needs (the social benefit theory) and the premise that § 170 status
carries with it the imprimatur of government approval, the court ruled that
by virtue of the charitable contribution provision, "the Government has
become sufficiently entwined with private parties to call forth a duty to en-
sure compliance with the Fifth Amendment by the parties through whom it
chooses to act." 5' The court reasoned that:
[t]he public nature of the activity delegated to the organization in
question, the degree of control the government has retained as to the
purposes and organizations which may benefit, and the aura of gov-
ernment approval inherent in an exempt ruling by the Internal Reve-
nue Service, all serve to distinguish the benefits at issue from the
general run of deductions available under the Internal Revenue
Code. 152
On the question of § 501 (c)(7) income tax exemption for the "exempt
function income" of nonprofit groups, however, the court explicitly re-
jected the "subsidy" rationale, writing that "the deduction for 'exempt
function income' does not operate to provide a grant of federal funds
through the tax system." '53 Rather, the court reasoned, "it is part and par-
cel of defining appropriate subjects of taxation." 154 Nor was there, in the
court's view, any indication of government approval in the designation of a
group as exempt. "Congress does not violate the Constitution," the court
wrote, "by failing to tax private discrimination where there is no other act
of Government involvement." 155 Failure to tax, in and of itself, would not
constitute, could not constitute, state action. "To find a violation solely
from the State's failure to act would ... eliminate the 'state action' doc-
trine." 156 By way of contrast, the exemption given to fraternal organiza-
tions under § 501(c)(8) does amount to state action, partly because the ex-
clusion is "provided only to particular organizations with particular
purposes" and partly because the exemption attaches to "unrelated busi-
ness income" (e.g., passive investment income) and seemed to the court
150. See id. at 462.
151. Id. at 456.
152. Id. at 457.
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unlike a refining of the appropriate subjects of taxation. 15 7
As to the argument that exemption from taxation and deductibility of
contribution constitutes federal financial assistance in violation of the Civil
Rights Act, the court agreed that "the provision of a tax deduction for
charitable contributions is a grant of federal financial assistance within the
scope of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.""'8 Citing Professor Surrey's work,
the court noted that the deduction "operates in effect as a Government
matching grant" and is no different from the provision of federal property
for reduced consideration.5 9 Tax exempt status under § 501(c)(7) does not
constitute a grant of federal funds, but tax exempt status under § 501(c)(8),
which "cannot be explained simply as a matter of pure tax policy... oper-
ates in fact as a subsidy" and thus falls within the coverage of the Civil
Rights Act. 6 ' Under the McGlotten court's analysis, closer scrutiny is
deemed appropriate when a scheme's structure is "suspicious" or "un-
usual"-i.e., when it cannot be justified or rationalized by the court as a
reflection of the court's understanding of tax policy.
There is another implication of the notion that tax exemptions are
functionally the equivalent of direct subsidies. The alleged indistinguish-
ability of the two, and the presumed constitutionality of tax exemptions,
can be used syllogistically to defend as constitutional direct cash aid to
churches. 6' After all, if tax exemption is unremarkable, and if direct sub-
sidies and tax exemptions are "the same," then surely direct subsidies are
unremarkable. This is the flip side of Professor Adler's argument (that di-
rect subsidies are plainly unconstitutional, that tax exemptions are the same
as direct subsidies, and that therefore tax exemptions are unconstitutional
as well). Professor Adler would question the premise of the first syllogism.
Justice Rehnquist would question the premise of the second. The point is
that if one accepts the constitutionalization of Professor Surrey's theories,
then either direct aid to churches is perfectly constitutional, or tax exemp-
tions are not. Perhaps, instead, the error lies in constitutionalizing tax ex-
penditure doctrine. Perhaps the syllogisms fail because tax exemptions
157. Id. at 459.
158. Id. at 462.
159. Id.
160. Id. On the McGlotten decision, see Boris I. Bittker & Kenneth M. Kaufman,
Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51,
_ (1972). See also SURREY, supra note 114, at 42-46; SURREY & McDANML, supra note
116, at 124-26; Harvey P. Dale, Standing to Challenge Tax Exempt Status, 307 PLI TAX
491; Galvin & Devins, supra note 56, at 1375-76. For another decision employing similar
analysis, see Jackson v. Statler Found., 496 F.2d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding that ac-
tivities of tax-exempt charitable organization are state action).
161. SURREY, supra note 114, at 129 n.12.
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really are not "for all intents and purposes" the same as direct subsidies. 62
III. THE SEPARATION PRINCIPLE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. The Unworkability of the Absolute Separation Model
Some argue that the principle of separation of church and state em-
bodied in the Establishment Clause requires tax exemption for churches,
whether or not also provided to non-profit organizations. 163 It is said that
the state actually lacks the power to tax both the property and the income of
churches.'64 Thus, one scholar recently wrote, "[t]he issue.., is not
whether the state is allowed to grant tax [exemptions] to entities dedicated
to fulfilling the role of religion in civil society, but whether the state has
any power to tax such entities at all." '65
The logical corollary to this, however, is that the state need not (and
perhaps must not) provide to churches any of the benefits that would oth-
erwise accrue to members of civil society-the idea being that the church is
"outside" the civil society, somewhat like a foreign embassy on American
soil. There is little historical support for the proposition that the framers of
the amendment viewed separation in this extreme sense"6 rather than in the
more benign sense of "noninterference" (either one with the other, both to
protect religious liberty in the Williams sense and to protect government in
the Jefferson sense). Further, the view of state tax exemptions as mandated
by the Establishment Clause is conceptually incompatible with the federal-
ist (" no-interference") view of the clause, whereby the clause itself merely
162. See Bittker & Kaufman, supra note 160, at 64 ("Whatever may be said for the
usefulness of this intellectual construct for other purposes, we question the validity of al-
lowing constitutional violations to hinge on it."); see also Kotterman, 972 P. 2d at 619
(" Modem economic theory, under some circumstances, may be helpful to our understand-
ing .... [lit does not necessarily govern constitutional interpretation").
163. See, e.g., Brief of the Synagogue Council of America & Its Constituents at 9,
Walz, 397 U.S. 664.
164. The argument would clearly lose some of its force if applied to the deduction for
charitable contributions.
165. Titus supra note 28, at 516; see also Glenn Goodwin, Note, Would Caesar Tax
God? The Constitutionality of Governmental Taxation of Churches, 35 DRAKE L. REv. 383,
398 (1986); Oliver S. Thomas, The Power to Destroy: The Eroding Constitutional Argu-
ments for Church Tax Exemption and the Practical Effect on Churches, 22 CuMB. L. REv.
605, 610 (1992).
166. It is a view, however, consistent with some early influential American religious
writing. See COBB, supra note 22, at 485-86 (discussing the writings of Jonathan Edwards
and his notion that "the Church was greater than the State, and in an entirely different
sphere," that it "was not of this world and could not be subject to the kingdoms of this
world").
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serves to protect state establishment (the epitome of non-separation) from
federal intervention.'67 Finally, however, as explained below, the absolute
separation model poses significant practical problems within the context of
the complicated economic relationship between today's government and its
citizens.1 68
It follows from the tax-and-spend prohibition that the Establishment
Clause speaks to some direct non-cash outlays from government to church.
After all, if the federal government may not give the Presbyterian Church
cash from its coffers, surely it may not give the Methodists twenty acres of
the public's land on which to build a church building, or spend taxpayer
funds on prayer books and choir robes for the local Catholic diocese. We
presume this to be true, as well, of items not inherently religious-pens and
pencils for the Sunday school, for instance, a guest ledger for the front en-
trance of the church, or a personal computer for every (parochial as well as
public) classroom. 69 One would assume that this extends to churches built
at taxpayers expense, and to ministers trained at taxpayer expense or sala-
ried at taxpayer expense and then employed wherever the government
might think it expedient to do so.
Such non-cash outlays are paid for with taxpayer funds, and then
handed over to a church for the church's use, in its sole discretion. This
sort of coerced support of religion is virtually indistinguishable from the
model of "establishment" that Madison and Jefferson aimed to prevent-
the primary distinction being the addition of an extra step (i.e., taxes raised,
taxes spent on item, item given to church)-a step that should not, under
167. Obviously the First Amendment on its face could be read to forbid federal taxa-
tion. One very literal interpretation of the Establishment Clause holds that in enacting the
Internal Revenue Code provisions that pertain to churches, religious organizations, and
ministers of the gospel, Congress has made a law respecting "an establishment of religion"
(i.e., it equates the latter with "religious establishments") and, thus, quite literally, has con-
travened the clause. See, e.g., John M. Swomley, The Impact of Tax Exemption and De-
ductibility on Churches and Public Policy, 22 CumOB. L. REv. 595, 597 (1991-92). This
would be true as well of I.R.S. regulations that implement the statutory directive, as legisla-
tive agencies are wholly derivative from acts of Congress and presumably their actions are
identically constrained. The argument is that the clause prohibits the Congress (and its
agencies) from passing legislation and regulations that purport to apply to churches qua
churches. The Court suggested nearly a century ago that this reading of the clause might be
too restrictive, noting that "an establishment of religion" is not the same thing as "a relig-
ious establishment." Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 297 (1899).
168. See discussion of absolute separation model infra part IV.A.
169. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 251 (1977) (striking Ohio statute that
authorized expenditures of funds for purchase of instructional material and equipment)
(Burger, C.J., Rehnquist and White, JJ., dissenting) (Powell, J., concurring only in the
judgment). "If a grant in cash to parents is impermissible, we fail to see how a grant in kind
in goods furthering the religious enterprise can fare any better." Id.
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Madison's logic, make any difference. Here, still, civil authority forces a
man to contribute his own money to support the propagation of religious
opinion and doctrine. 7 Thus, President Madison wrote in 1811, vetoing a
bill that would have granted to a Baptist congregation the federal land on
which it had erroneously built its church, that the grant would constitute a
"precedent for the appropriation of funds of the United States for the use
and support of religious societies, contrary to the article of the Constitution
which declares that 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion."" 171
, Notably, however, both state governments and the federal government
have provided-and in some instances still provide-exactly these sorts of
taxpayer-funded non-cash gifts to religion. Individual states, for instance,
underwrote the cost of Bibles and prayer books for rural churches well into
the nineteenth century.'72 States also donated land and services, 173 and the
United States Code still authorizes the federal government to give surplus
land to churches. 74 Both the early Congress and the early state legislatures
funded missionary work among the Native Americans. 75 The federal gov-
ernment has built churches and has paid priest salaries, even as recently as
one hundred years ago. 176 Common or not, however, these practices-at
170. Suppose, instead, the government were to sell at auction all of the items collected
by the DEA pursuant to federal drug forfeiture laws, and were to use the auction proceeds to
purchase prayer books for the Catholic Church. This is still a "grant in kind in goods fur-
thering the religious enterprise," Wolman, 433 U.S. at 251, and should not be sustainable on
the ground that the originating funds were not levied by tax.
171. Veto Message of February 28, 1811, TiB WRrrINGS OF JAMES MADISON 40 (Hunt
ed., 1900); see also LEVY, supra note 17, at 119. Madison's opposition to land grants ex-
tended to nonpreferential land grants-for instance, land set aside in each township for any
church. Id. at 129-30.
172. Witte, supra note 17, at 406.
173. Id.
174. The Surplus Property Act of 1944, ch. 479, 58 Stat. 765 (1944) (codified as
amended at 40 U.S.C. §§ 484(j), 484(k) (1994)) had by 1961 resulted in nearly 500 grants of
land and/or buildings to sectarian schools. Brief of the State of N.Y. at 10, Walz, 246
N.E.2d 517. Indeed, it was the donation of a 77-acre tract of government surplus land to a
nonprofit educational institution with a Christian orientation, pursuant to § 484(k), that
prompted the Establishment Clause challenge in Valley Forge College v. Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1981). The Supreme Court never
reached the Establishment Clause question, finding (over a strong dissent) that the plaintiffs
lacked standing insofar as they challenged an exercise of the power in Congress vested by
the property clause of the federal constitution, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The statutory
scheme remains in place today. See 40 U.S.C. § 471-92 (1994).
175. Witte, supra note 17, at 406-07; see also Laycock, supra note 101, at 914-16.
Professor Laycock argues that the missionaries were seen as a cheap way to educate Native
Americans, and that the civil authorities in question did not perceive themselves to be pro-
viding tax support to churches.
176. President Jefferson signed a treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians, for instance, pur-
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least when engaged in by the federal government-are not in a relevant
way distinguishable from the model of establishment that the drafters of the
Establishment Clause sought to prohibit.1"
By way of contrast, it is widely presumed that the Establishment
Clause permits state and federal government to provide directly to churches
fire and police protection, as well as the services of the United States mili-
tary, the national guard, and the local dog catcher, and also the benefit of
the availability of the civil justice system (for example, to protect their
property both by enabling prosecution of trespassers and arsonists and by
recording their property deeds). 7 ' This is true, even though the govern-
ment uses tax revenue to fund these services, which are then provided "free
of charge" to churches, other nonprofits, and anyone else not subject to the
particular tax. 79 That the government uses tax revenue to fund some serv-
ices which are then provided free to churches and others, and that this is
ordinarily not thought to violate the Establishment Clause, is critical be-
cause it suggests that the Establishment Clause permits a church to receive
at least some benefits (i.e., some things indisputably of actual value to the
church) ultimately at taxpayer expense. 80
One might argue that the class of benefits legitimately provided at
taxpayer-expense (the class containing police protection, fire protection,
and dog catchers) is distinguishable because the government never attempts
suant to which the federal government agreed to build a church and support its Catholic
priest in return for tribal land. CORD, supra note 22, at 38-39; Laycock, supra note 101, at
914-16. Presidents Adams, Jackson, and Van Buren signed similar treaties with the Osages,
Kickapoo, and Oneida Indians, respectively. CORD, supra note 22, at 59-60. Indeed, by the
time tax support for religious instruction on Indian reservations was terminated in 1897, Act
of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62, Congress was appropriating over $500,000 annually for
the practice. CORD, supra note 22, at 80.
177. One context in which non-cash disbursements have been sustained-over vigor-
ous dissent-is that of textbooks "loaned" to parochial students. See Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968). "I still subscribe to the belief that tax-raised funds
cannot constitutionally be used to support religious schools, buy their school books, erect
their buildings, pay their teachers, or pay any other of their maintenance expenses, even to
the extent of one penny .... [A]ny government that supplies such aids is to that extent a
tyranny." Id. at 253-54 (Black, J., dissenting).
178. See, e.g., Steffey, supra note 109, at 918-19.
179. This would include, for example, a member of the community below the mini-
mum tax level, if the source of revenue in question were the income tax, or a person without
real property, if the source of revenue in question were the local property tax.
180. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 393 (1983) ("One fixed principle in this field
is our consistent rejection of the argument that 'any program which in some manner aids an
institution with a religious affiliation' violates the Establishment Clause."); see also Meek
v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975) ("[I]t is clear that not all legislative programs that




to (and as a practical matter could not) link the individual's actual tax con-
tribution to the corresponding benefit he receives. The very nature of this
sort of intangible benefit necessitates that it be provided to everyone with-
out any clear and crisp accounting and billing. 8' How, indeed, could the
church (or a tax protester, or an indigent person) not be provided the bene-
fit of the United States Army, if everyone else is still to receive that bene-
fit? One might argue that the Establishment Clause necessarily bows to
this reality of accounting.
Take a local property tax, which in part funds the local fire station.
One might say that a family living in a rented apartment receives the bene-
fit of this fire station's services (or the benefit of merely knowing the serv-
ices are available), even though it does not pay property tax. So, too, does
a church exempt from that tax. And for that matter, a homeless person
living in a makeshift cardboard shanty. One might say the family, the
church, and the homeless person receive the benefit "for free" even while
others are paying for the same benefit.8 2 Indeed, one might even say that
those who actually pay this tax are paying for the fire station to service the
renters and homeless as well as the church-because, of course, their tax
dollars flow into the fund in question, and are then disbursed to the fire sta-
tion, which services all members of the community, without regard to
whether they were required to pay the property tax in question. (Really,
without regard to whether they paid it. A tax protester obligated to remit
his property taxes and simply refusing to do so receives the same police
protection, fire protection, and dog catching services.) The point is that the
Establishment Clause does not require some sort of quid pro quo for these
benefits (i.e., we do not require a final accounting) because it is next to im-
possible to determine with precision the value of the benefit received, and
the amount paid in actually allocated to that benefit. 3 For instance, does
one look at the amount one paid during one year, or over a decade, or over
181. "It is difficult to measure the consumption of certain public services, such as fire
or police protection, traffic control, or road maintenance." Rebecca S. Rudnick, State &
Local Taxes on Nonprofit Organizations, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 321, 345-46 (1993). Addi-
tionally, of course, the person who ultimately bears the burden for the tax is not always the
person who receives the associated service. A sophisticated analysis would need to account
for this. Bittker, supra note 6, at 1306; see also id. at 1308-09.
182. The family in rented housing probably "pays" the tax indirectly in the form of
higher rent to its landlord (who does pay property tax), but the same cannot be said of the
church or the homeless person.
183. Some sort of final accounting would presumably be necessary if the "fair share"
system were to be perfectly accurate, so that corrections could be made if entities were taxed
too heavily. Bittker, supra note 6, at 1305 n.40. This would be additionally complicated by
the various levels of government to which one might have paid taxes, and from whom one
might have received service. See id. at 1307.
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a lifetime, when determining whether a person paid his "fair share?" Are
police and fire protection conceived of in an insurance model rather than a
fee-for-service model? Is the value in the actual receipt of the service or in
its availability, or both? Is the value of the service measured objectively or
subjectively?
If one accepts this explanation, however, one is left to wonder what
would result if the government could earmark taxes and draw a crisp ac-
counting link between an entity's actual contribution and the corresponding
benefit it receives (take, for instance, the postal service, which provides the
government's services on a fee-for-service basis, and reduces the fees for
nonprofit organizations, including churches)."8 4 One might, for example,
conclude that if the government did charge for police and fire services in
the model of a private insurance company-i.e., if one paid a tax ear-
marked for "fire insurance" and the amount were not based on property
value but rather the likelihood of fire and projected cost of putting such a
fire out (a risk assessment)-then perhaps the government could not ex-
empt churches from premiums and nevertheless provide such services to
them.18 5
This is, of course, why proponents of tax exemptions have been cau-
tious about endorsing the quid pro quo (" social benefit") theory to justify
religious tax exemptions. The social benefit theory is in a sense an implicit
acknowledgment of and effort to rebut the "fair share" argument-the no-
tion that churches inappropriately (and perhaps unconstitutionally) receive
certain benefits (like police and fire protection) without paying their "fair
share" in taxes. And the same concerns apply. Not only is it next to im-
possible to determine whether a church is actually paying (in services ren-
dered, or in taxes surrendered) for its "fair share" of benefits received (i.e.,
whether the quid and the quo are roughly equivalent in value)l 86-but once
184. "The United States Postal Service... grants a special bulk rate to written material
disseminated by certain nonprofit organizations-religious, educational, scientific, philan-
thropic, agricultural, labor, veterans', and fraternal organizations." Arkansas Writers Proj-
ect v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 238 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Domestic Mail
Manual § 623 (1985)).
185. Certainly if one were committed to a fair share arrangement, one would want to
think carefully before exempting any entities from the premiums and still providing the
service. There might be good public policy reasons so to treat nonprofit organizations, but
clearly one would have to confront the Establishment Clause issue with respect to churches.
186. A related concern is implicit in the Walz Court's rejection of the quid pro quo
theory as the secular "legislative purpose" behind tax exemptions. It was "unnecessary,"
Justice Burger wrote for the Court, "to justify the tax exemption on the social welfare serv-
ices or (good works) that some churches perform for parishioners and others," noting that
churches "vary substantially in the scope of such services" and that "to give emphasis to so
valuable an aspect of the work of religious bodies would introduce an element of govern-
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one argues that churches should and do pay for police and fire protection,
one must logically extend the argument further, and require them similarly
to pay for such things as foreign aid, national defense, and the waging of
war.187 And, of course, if tax exemptions are conceived and intended as a
quid pro quo, then one must at least confront the possibility that the prohi-
bition on direct cash outlays to churches extends to this sort of arrange-
ment, that perhaps the government may not enter into such arrangements
with religious entities to perform tasks it chooses not to do (or may not do)
itself.,8
Perhaps the better distinction is that fire protection and police protec-
tion (and the national guard) are incidents of belonging to civil society.8 9
That is, the benefit of their availability (albeit at general taxpayer expense)
is simply incidental to being a part of a civil and political body.' 9° And
that our notion of government would neither permit their cost to be as-
signed to the individual, nor permit the citizen to be conceived of as a
mental evaluation and standards as to the worth of particular social welfare programs, thus
producing a kind of continuing day-to-day relationship which the policy of neutrality seeks
to minimize." Walz, 397 U.S. at 674.
187. Bittker, supra note 6, at 1308. Ultimately, Professor Bittker concludes, "fair
share" is an (inappropriate) effort to "extract a rule of constitutional obligation from a con-
cept of fairness in the distribution of public obligations." Id. at 1305. He also points out
that the fair share system (which focuses more on "benefit received" than "ability to pay")
is contrary to the basic principle of a "progressive" tax. Id.
188. See id.
189. The fact that such incidental benefits inevitably "free up" funds that can be
turned to religious purposes (i.e., the church is relieved of the financial burden of paying for
private fire protection or the financial burden of self-insuring for fire loss) does not neces-
sarily make them unconstitutional. See, e.g., Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987) ("A law is not uncon-
stitutional simply because it allows churches to advance religion, which is their very pur-
pose."); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973) (" [Tihe Court has not accepted the re-
current argument that all aid is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it
to spend its other resources on religious ends."); Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18 (noting that
without provision of policemen, fire protection, and sewage disposal, some parochial
schools might be unable financially to operate and some parents might be unwilling to enroll
their children in such schools, but rejecting suggestion that Establishment Clause requires
"cutting off church schools from these services" which are general in nature and safety-
oriented).
190. A similar notion of "incidental benefit" has been articulated by various members
of the Court in the nonpublic school aid cases-i.e., health services, diagnostic psychologi-
cal evaluations, and diagnostic speech services have been described as "fallfing] within that
class of general welfare services for children that may be provided by the state regardless of
the incidental benefit that accrues to church related schools." Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S.
349, 371 n.21 (1975). The idea is that children receive certain benefits from the state and
that the benefit incidentally accruing to the parochial school they attend is neither here nor
there. Perhaps one might say this of nutritionally balanced school lunches, annual tubercu-
losis tests, rubella shots, eye exams, and sewage disposal.
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"consumer." The danger is that "incidental to civil society" may be a
somewhat subjective standard, and that the framers unquestionably envi-
sioned a narrower set of benefits "incidental" to belonging to civil society
than our continually-expanding welfare state currently taxes us for and then
provides to us.19 '
B. The Question of Entanglement
The ban on "entanglement" of government and church, a corollary of
the separation principle, has also been invoked by both supporters and op-
ponents of religious tax exemptions. Dicta in Walz raised the question
whether tax exemptions (or taxation instead of exemption) might cause an
unconstitutional "entanglement" of church and state. "Elimination of ex-
emption," the Walz Court wrote would "expand the involvement of gov-
ernment by giving rise to valuation of church property, tax liens, tax fore-
closures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the train
of those legal processes." 92 On the other hand, it noted, granting tax ex-
emptions to churches "also gives rise" to involvement.'93 On balance, the
Court concluded, granting tax exemptions would cause less involvement. 194
Although the discussion was brief, the entanglement question has
been debated ever since. Some argue that the prohibition on government
entanglement with religion requires tax exemption for churches. The basic
notion is that the relationship that results from administration of property
and/or income taxes is entangling. 9 ' In theory, for instance, administration
of property taxes will require measurement of the value of an unmarketable
property of primarily religious significance. Administration of income
taxes might plunge the Internal Revenue Service into examination of the
nature of the relationship between a church and its employees. Perhaps
deriving a special solution to the accounting problems noted earlier, a solu-
191. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993) (sustain-
ing application of Individuals with Disabilities Act so as to finance a deaf student's use of a
state-employed sign-language interpreter at a Roman Catholic high school); Agostini, 521
U.S. at 234 (allowing provision of Title I public school teachers to parochial schools to pro-
vide remedial instruction or premises).
192. 397 U.S. at 674.
193. Id. at 674-75; see also Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493
U.S. 378, 393 (1990) (noting that both taxation and exemption involve some level of in-
volvement between government and religion).
194. 397 U.S. at 675-76 ("The exemption creates only a minimal and remote involve-
ment between church and state and far less than taxation of churches. It restricts the fiscal
relationship between church and state, and tends to complement and reinforce the desired
separation insulating each from the other.").
195. Cf. Barham, supra note 6, at 413-14 (arguing that the parsonage exclusion pro-
motes separation of church and state by restricting the fiscal relationship between the two).
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tion fitted to the unique needs of the non-profit organization, will also nec-
essarily require government to intrude into church concerns.
None of these arguments is particularly persuasive. While it may be
true that tax exemption would "alleviate the possibility of a hostile rela-
tionship between church and state" 96 (no one would dispute the point-tax
exemption of most private individuals would "alleviate the possibility of a
hostile relationship" with the state), that is not what the entanglement pro-
hibition seeks to prevent. And while it may be true that tax exemption
(particularly property exemption) furthers the values of separation and in-
stitutional autonomy, it seems unlikely the clause requires treatment of
churches as separate sovereignties that simply happen to lie within the
boundaries of a particular city or state. This interpretation of "separation"
is inconsistent with the proposition that generally applicable laws (health
codes, criminal laws, and fire codes) at least presumptively apply to
churches and religious persons as much as to anyone else. The prospect of
genuinely "intermeddling" in church affairs is hardly implicated and re-
ligious liberty barely threatened, when the government assesses the value
of a tract of land or the resale value of a church building, or when the gov-
ernment defines "income" in a way that accounts for the special situation
of non-profit entities.
At the other end of the spectrum lies the somewhat more plausible ar-
gument that it is the tax exemption, instead, that creates the unconstitu-
tional entanglement. 7 The argument is made of property and income tax
exemptions, for instance, on the ground that administration of these ex-
emptions requires the legislature or the taxing authority or the courts to de-
fine and identify "religion" or "church." 198 Similar definitional inquiries
are demanded by the parsonage exclusion of the federal income tax code,
which allows an exclusion only to a "minister of the gospel."' 99 But this
argument, too, is a red herring.
196. Witte, supra note 19, at 367.
197. See Adler, supra note 109, at 900-01 (arguing that while both taxation and ex-
emption cause "entanglement" concerns, the kinds of questions that arise with respect to the
former-e.g., the value of property and the measure of income-are less constitutionally
troublesome than the kinds of questions that arise with respect to the latter--e.g., what con-
stitutes a religion).
198. The Internal Revenue Code distinguishes between a "church" and a "religious
organization," giving the former more favorable treatment, by e.g., dispensing with the
requirement that an income tax return even be filed, see 26 U.S.C. § 6033 (1994).
199. See, e.g., Elliott M. Schachner, Religion and the Public Treasury After Taxation
with Representation of Washington, Mueller, and Bob Jones, 1984 UTAH L. REv. 275 (ar-
guing that the parsonage exclusion violates the "entanglement" prohibition). But see
Barham, supra note 6, at 398 (arguing that parsonage exclusion does not violate the First
Amendment).
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Indisputably, the federal income tax code has drawn the government
into definitional inquiries.20  For instance, the I.R.S. has developed a
"fourteen factor test" to determine whether an entity is a "church" within
the meaning of the various code provisions using the term (such as 26
U.S.C. § 170).201 Among the criteria that the I.R.S. considers relevant are
(1) a recognized creed and form of worship; (2) a distinct ecclesiastical
government; (3) a formal code of doctrine and discipline; (4) membership
not associated with any other church; and (5) an organization of ministers
who serve the church's congregation(s) and submit to formal study.20 2 An
entity typically does not need to satisfy each criterion to qualify as a
"church"; rather, the criteria serve as guidelines, giving the I.R.S. flexibil-
ity in its decision whether to grant or deny applicability of the provision in
question.2 3  Nevertheless, plenty of instances can be found where the
I.R.S. applied the fourteen factors and concluded that a particular entity
was simply not a "church." 204
200. The Internal Revenue Service has, for instance, interpreted § 107 to require that
the person claiming the exclusion be one who is "duly ordained, commissioned, or li-
censed" and who performs "ordinary ministerial services." 26 U.S.C. § 1402 (1994). The
tax courts have thus gotten into the business of defining both "minister of the gospel" and
ordinary ministerial duties. See generally Foster, supra note 6, at 153-55 (overview of
I.R.S. regulations governing the parsonage exclusion); see e.g., Salkov v. Commissioner, 46
T.C. 190, 194 (1966) ("By definition a 'minister' is one who is authorized to administer the
sacraments, preach, and conduct services of worship. And 'gospel' means glad tidings or a
message, teaching, doctrine, or course of action having certain efficacy or validity. 'Gos-
pel,' when used with a capital G, generally means the teachings of the Christian church as
originally preached by Jesus Christ and his apostles .... ). For examples of specific rul-
ings, see Toavs v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 897 (1977) (ruling that clergy operating nursing
home operated by nonprofit organization associated with Assemblies of God Church was
not entitled to parsonage exclusion); Colbert v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 449 (1974) (denying
parsonage exclusion to person who claimed to be Baptist minister but who primarily lec-
tured from the pulpit about anticommunism); Silverman v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 727
(1972) (finding that cantor of Jewish faith is a minister of the gospel and entitled to parson-
age exclusion); Haimowitz v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M.(CCH) 1812 (U.S. Tax Ct. Jan. 23,
1997) (finding retired temple employee not a minister of the gospel because he did not per-
form services considered to be "those of a minister").
201. See Remarks of I.R.S. Commissioner Jerome Kurtz, PLI Seventh Biennial Con-
ference on Tax Planning (Jan. 9, 1987), reprinted in Fed. Taxes (P-H) 54,820 (1978) (an-
nouncing fourteen-factor test).
202. See, e.g., Spiritual Outreach Soc'y v. Commissioner, 927 F.2d 335, 338 (8th Cir.
1991) (applying fourteen factor test on appeal from the tax court, finding that Spiritual Out-
reach was not a church, noting that it lacked an established congregation, a ministry, and
any provision for religious education of the young).
203. See Flynn, supra note 6, at 788.
204. See, e.g., Church of the Visible Intelligence v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 55, 63-64
(1983) (finding plaintiff a "religious organization" for § 501(c)(3) purposes, but not a
"church" for § 170 purposes, using fourteen-factor test). Despite the existence and appli-
cation of the so-called fourteen-factor test, the I.RS. tends to approach these questions with
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The fourteen factors and the specific decisions applying them not-
withstanding (which may raise legitimate establishment concerns insofar as
they tend to favor religions with which I.R.S. employees and tax courts are
familiar-i.e., "established" religions, in the colloquial sense of the word),
the basic definitional inquiry required by the Internal Revenue Code (" is
this a church or a religious organization") is not inherently forbidden of
government or, more specifically, of the courts. Nor may the Court's deci-
sion in Employment Division v. Smith be taken to mean that threshold defi-
nitional concerns preclude government from granting religious exemptions
at all.205 The Smith Court, after all, simply held that nothing in the Free
Exercise Clause requires the government to do so. More specifically, it
rejected the argument for a free-exercise exemption from generally appli-
cable criminal law for religiously motivated conduct and an alternative plea
for the rigid scrutiny of Sherbert v. Verner 06 to apply (so as to favor an
exemption unless strict scrutiny were satisfied), and concluded that "the
government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of so-
cially harmful conduct 'cannot depend on measuring the effects of a gov-
ernmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development.""'2 7 The
Free Exercise Clause, it ruled, does not require the government to assess
the impact of its generally applicable laws on religion.2 8 This is not to say,
caution, denying exemption on any other plausible grounds before reaching the definitional
one. This avoidance policy has, no doubt, permitted a number of fraudulent claimants to
proceed with impunity. Fraud is an inevitable byproduct of tax exemption schemes, how-
ever, and in the context of religious tax exemptions has a long and notorious history. See,
e.g., CAROLYN WEBER, A HISTORY OF TAX & ExPENDrrURE iN THE WESTERN WORLD 106
(1986) (discussing tax fraud under Emperor Constantine after his conversion to Christianity
and specifically problems with the exemption of Christian clergy from municipal taxes and
liturgies, and noting his solution---" Constantine rescinded this immunity and forbade decu-
rions from taking hold orders [and] [i]f a man wished to enter the priesthood, he was re-
quired to demonstrate his faith by surrendering one-fourth of his property to the state"); see
also Christopher S. Jackson, The Inane Gospel of Tax Protest: Resist Rendering Unto Cae-
sar- Whatever His Demands, 32 GoNz. L. REv. 291, 318-20 (1996-1997) (describing two
ways people attempt to avoid personal income tax using religious exemption provisions
currently available under Internal Revenue Code, and describing such attempts as "perva-
sive").
205. See Wayne McCormack, Subsidies for Expression and the Future of Free Exer-
cise, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 327, 327-28 (arguing that Smith implies that judicial granting of
religious exemptions from laws of general applicability would be tantamount to the estab-
lishment of religion because it would force the judiciary to define religion); see also id at
328 ("Elimination of legislative exemptions for religious practices may well be the next
stage of separation of church and state.").
206. 374 U.S. 398, 404-07 (1963).
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however, that the Establishment Clause, as well, would prohibit the sort of
inquiry involved (the exact nature of the particular religious belief, the par-
ticular seriousness with which a plaintiff holds that belief, the extent to
which the law in question truly conflicts with the belief, and the like).
While Justice Scalia's opinion suggested that courts should not engage in
this sort of inquiry,2" 9 this view of judicial incompetence would prohibit
administration of the religious exemptions carved into a great number of
our laws, including, for instance, the Universal Military Training and
Service Act which permits exemption for any person "who, by reason of
religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in
war in any form."2 ' One danger here is that government might simply
enact an across-the-board exemption from generally applicable laws for
anyone able to prove that a particular law burdens his religion. This was
precisely the reaction of Congress to Justice Scalia's writings in Smith; it
was the theory of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.2 1' The problem
with such an across-the-board exemption is that it amounts to a wholesale
preferencing of religion and of explanations for non-participation clothed-
whether falsely or truthfully-in religious terms and phrases.212
The Internal Revenue Code indisputably draws the Internal Revenue
Service and the courts into foundational definitional inquiries. It also re-
quires application of those definitions to persons claiming religious ex-
emptions; that is, it requires assessments of religious claims, some of which
have been drawn out and hotly contested. 213 But Walz does not support the
209. See id. at 887 ("The courts must not presume to determine the place of a particu-
lar belief in a religion, or the plausibility of a religious claim.").
210. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335 (1970). Even much more cumber-
some administrative schemes are thought sometimes not to cause constitutionally problem-
atic entanglement. The lower courts are split, for instance, on the question of whether the
no-entanglement prohibition requires an exemption for religious institutions from the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994) (ADEA). Compare Sori-
ano v. Xavier Univ. Corp., 687 F. Supp. 1188, 1188 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (finding Establish-
ment Clause does not require religious institution exemption from ADEA) with Cochran v.
St. Louis Prep. Seminary, 717 F. Supp. 1413, 1415-16 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (holding ADEA
cannot apply to church-operated schools because application of McDonnell-Douglas test
and enforcement by EEOC raise entanglement concerns).
211. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994) (found unconstitutional, City of Boeme v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 532 (1997)).
212. Cf William Van Alstyne, The Failure of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 DUKE L. J. 291, 307 n.46 (arguing that
the RFRA's flaw was not that it required courts to inquire into the substantiality of a par-
ticular burden on the free exercise of religion).
213. The most famous of these quarrels, of course, has been the forty-year dispute
between the Internal Revenue Service and the Church of Scientology which-despite a Su-
preme Court ruling for the I.R.S.-the Scientologists ultimately won. The battle began in
1967, when the I.R.S. revoked the organization's § 501(c)(3) tax exempt status on the
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theory that the clause embodies some sort of" least entangling alternative"
requirement.214 (This may well be a desirable policy, but it is certainly not
required by the Establishment Clause. 215) And in any event, a general
taxation scheme providing for exemptions for nonprofit organizations in-
cluding churches does not require the government to parse the tenets of a
faith or to determine their relative centrality-no more so than does the
conscientious objector exemption from the military draft.216
IV. THE EQUAL TREATMENT THEORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Barring federal interference with state decisions to establish or dises-
tablish religion, prohibiting direct federal aid to religion, and precluding
government entanglement with religion are among the core principles that
the Establishment Clause advances. This does not mean, however, that the
clause does not serve other purposes or embody other principles. For in-
grounds that the organization was operated for the financial betterment of private individu-
als rather than for religious purposes. Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381,
443 (1984), affid, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987). Deductibility of charitable contributions
under § 170 was, accordingly, also denied by the I.R.S. Appellate court reactions to this
denial varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Compare Foley v. Commissioner, 844 F.2d
94 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding payments deductible), vacated, 490 U.S. 1103 (1989) with
Christianse v. Commissioner, 843 F.2d 418 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding payments nondeduct-
ible), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3174 (1989). The Supreme Court reached the issue in 1989,
affirming the I.R.S. decision to reject the deductibility of contributions. Hemandez v.
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 692-93 (1989). In the wake of this ruling, the Scientologists
began a campaign of constant litigation against the I.R.S., and also began to reformulate
their internal structure and creed. See James Walsh, Tax Treatment of the Church of Scien-
tology in the United States and the United Kingdom, 19 SuFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 33 1,
338 (1995). The I.R.S. then acquiesced, granting the Scientologists tax-exempt status under
§ 501(c)(3) in 1993. Rev. Rul. 93-73, 1993-2 C.B. 75.
214. But see Paulsen, supra note 76, at 350 (arguing for a least-entangling-alternative
reading) (" Simply put, 'excessive entanglement' means that the institutions of church and
state are more entangled than they need to be in order for government to accomplish its
otherwise legitimate purposes in the program or policy at issue."); Thomas, supra note 165,
at 608 (arguing that the Walz Court "suggested" tax exemption is constitutionally required);
Developments in the Law, supra note 109, at 1688 (arguing that the Walz Court "upheld the
exemption in order to avoid the entanglement of religion and the state that would result from
any attempt to tax religious organizations").
215. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233 ("Not all entanglements, of course, have the effect
of advancing or inhibiting religion. Interaction between church and state is inevitable, and
we have always tolerated some level of involvement between the two. Entanglement must
be 'excessive' before it runs afoul of the Establishment Clause.").
216. Nor is it true that an audit by the I.R.S. (or state equivalent) would necessarily
entangle the government in the church's affairs (such that taxation must necessarily be pro-
hibited). The prohibition on entanglement is not a guarantee of" immunity" from govern-
ment scrutiny. While it derives its force from the separation principle, it is primarily a guar-
antee that the government will not weigh in on religious questions or use its power or force
in an influential or intrusive manner that might interfere with religious liberty.
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stance, it has also been identified as a constraint on practices that carve di-
visive political lines on the basis of religion.217 It has been read by the
Court to prohibit government practices that give an appearance of "en-
dorsement" of a particular (or all) religion.218 While not explicit on the
face of the clause, these have been inferred over time, whether correctly or
incorrectly, and usually as corollaries to the Jeffersonian notion that there
should be an impenetrable wall of separation between church and state.
These principles appear not to be contravened by conventional religious
property and income tax exemptions.
This does not end the Establishment Clause inquiry. As explained
below, the Supreme Court's press tax jurisprudence shows that when the
provision at issue is a legislative tax scheme, the First Amendment also
requires us to delve into legislative motive and the structural aspects of the
scheme in question. Both "purpose and effect" principles and notions of
equal treatment inform the assessment of religious tax exemptions and sug-
gest their possible weakness.
A. The Press Cases
Without a doubt, many provisions in tax codes have two functions-
to encourage or to discourage certain economic behaviors, and to raise
revenue. Similarly it is clear that as to some provisions, the non-revenue
purpose predominates-i.e., the primary purpose of the scheme is the en-
couragement or discouragement of certain behaviors. 219 There can be no
217. See, e.g., Meek, 421 U.S. at 372 (finding that Pennsylvania statute providing for
loan of instructional equipment to nonpublic schools, due to recurring appropriations proc-
ess, "provides successive opportunities for political fragmentation and division along relig-
ious lines, one of the principle evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended to
protect").
218. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("The second and more direct infringement is government endorsement or disapproval of
religion. Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they
are insiders, favored members of the political community.").
219. Protective tariffs are an example of the latter. The Supreme Court sustained the
validity of protective tariffs in J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 412
(1928) (holding that "[s]o long as the motive of Congress and the effect of its legislative
action are to secure revenue for the benefit of the general welfare, the existence of other
motives in the selection of the subject of taxes cannot invalidate Congressional action"). It
is worth noting, however, that in J. W. Hampton, the secondary motive in question (influ-
encing imports) was itself independently sustainable on the strength of a freestanding power
in Congress (the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations). The case thus stands as
a bookend to the Child Labor Tax Case decided six years earlier, in which the Court struck
down a tax structured so as to accomplish a goal (deterring child labor) wholly beyond the
scope of Congress's enumerated powers. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 43-
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doubt that legislatures sometimes enact tax legislation with another goal in
mind entirely-hoping that the incentives and disincentives built into the
legislation will encourage behaviors and choices the legislature deems it
desirable to encourage. Although few would question the constitutionality
of a general revenue-raising tax on all property or on all income that hap-
pens also to fall on entities deemed somehow "especially protected" by
virtue of the First Amendment (e.g., newspapers or churches 2 ), it also
seems likely that the First Amendment must place some constraint on a
legislature's enactment of legislation that is only partly, if at all, designed
to raise revenue. Surely intentional use of the tax code to indirectly effect
substantive goals unrelated to revenue raising must be scrutinized just as if
the legislature had sought to effect these goals directly.221 It is in this re-
gard that the Court's jurisprudence on taxation of the press is instructive.
The press tax cases begin with the classic case-a tax which has as its
primary purpose not the raising of revenue but the discouraging or punish-
ing of the exercise of a constitutionally protected right. The Louisiana leg-
islature had enacted a "license tax" of two percent of the gross receipts
from 1he selling of advertisement space by any newspaper with a circula-
tion of at least 20,000 copies per week.222 The license tax thus applied, as
44 (1922). A third permutation would be where the secondary purpose of the tax actually
contravenes a freestanding prohibition on legislative enactments (such as the First Amend-
ment).
220. A generally applicable tax that happens to apply to entities exercising First
Amendment rights and that happens to affect or even to hamper such exercise does not for
that reason alone run afoul of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries,
493 U.S. at 389 (unanimously sustaining application of California's Sales and Use Tax to
distribution of religious materials by religious organization) (" California's generally appli-
cable sales and use tax... applies neutrally to all retail sales of tangible personal property
made in California."); Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575, 588 n.9 (1983) (The Court's "cases have consistently recognized that nondis-
criminatory taxes on the receipt or income of newspapers would be permissible."); id at
586 (" [T]he State could raise the revenue by taxing businesses generally."); id at 589 n.12
("Nothing... prevents the State from taxing the press in the same manner that it taxes other
enterprises."). We typically afford a legislature considerable latitude in determining the
subjects of taxation, the governing tax rates, and the appropriate taxable periods. The First
Amendment entitles neither the press nor the church to immunity from the burdens incident
to belonging to organized society.
221. This is, after all, the lesson of Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 40
(1922). This period marks the birth of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, in such
cases as Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926) (striking Cali-
fornia law that forbade private carriers by automobile for hire from operating between fixed
points in the state over state highways unless they obtained a certificate of convenience and
submitted to regulation as common carriers). See also Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233 (1936) (discussed below).
222. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 233. Note by way of comparison the municipal ordinance
at issue in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 106 (1943), which prohibited solicita-
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counsel for the appellees pointed out to the Court, to thirteen of the state's
163 newspapers, twelve of which opposed the dominant political party in
the state.223 The purpose of the statute was plain in its legislative history-
it was to inhibit the circulation of information reflecting a particular politi-
cal viewpoint224 by effectively reducing the net revenue realized from ad-
vertising in papers likely to express such a viewpoint.225 "Papers with a
circulation of 20,000" was the legislature's proxy for "papers opposing
Huey Long." The Court deemed the statute unconstitutional, as "a delib-
erate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of
information to which the public is entitled by virtue of constitutional guar-
anties." 2 6 It is difficult to imagine a tax on the press more like the British
"taxes on knowledge" that prompted the Free Press Clause227 in the first
instance.228 Surely the case would have turned out no differently if, with
the same legislative history in place and the same co-incidence of circula-
tion and viewpoint, Louisiana had enacted a two percent license tax on all
newspapers, fully exempting those with a circulation of fewer than 20,000
tion without a purchased license. The convictions of eight Jehovah's Witnesses were re-
versed by the Supreme Court, on the theory that the government may not condition one's
exercise of his constitutional rights on prior payment of a licensing fee. See id. at 108, 110;
id. at 115 (citing Grosjean); see also Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577-78
(1944) (reversing conviction of Jehovah's Witness under town ordinance that imposed a
license tax on business, occupations, and professions); id. at 577 (citing Grosjean). Imagine
by way of variation a tax on the distribution of newspapers-not on sales or profits, but a
flat five cents for every person handed a paper. Would this not fall within the literal scope
of Murdock? See id. at 112 ("It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a
preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a
sermon.").
223. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 240.
224. See id. at 251 (noting that the tax in question had " the plain purpose of penalizing
the publishers and curtailing the circulation of a selected group of newspapers").
225. Id. at 244-45.
226. Id. at 250.
227. See U.S. CoNST. amend. I (" Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom ... of the press .... ).
228. See Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 583 n.6 (describing Grosjean tax as tax on
knowledge). The Grosjean Court described as "obnoxious" such taxes on the press as the
"1 newspaper stamp tax and the tax on advertisement" where "revenue [is] of subordinate
concern" and "the dominant and controlling aim [is] to prevent, or curtail the opportunity
for, the acquisition of knowledge by the people in respect of their governmental affairs."
297 U.S. at 247. Such schemes harken back to centuries of English efforts to restrain
"popular" (anti-government) press via licensing, censorship, writs of attachment, seditious
libel prosecutions, injunction proceedings, and stiff taxation. The historical background of
the press clause is partly discussed in Grosfean, 297 U.S. at 245-49, and fully discussed in
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 712-21 (1931). See also RANDALL BEZANSON, TAxES ON
KNOWLEDGE IN AMERICA: EXAcTIONs ON THE PRESS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT
(1994); Gregory S. Asciolla, Note, Leathers v. Medlock: Differential Taxation of The Press
Survives Under the First Amendment, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 507, 515-16 (1992).
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copies a week. Cast either way, the measure is a penalty (in the guise of a
tax) on opposition to Huey Long.
However, the Court was strangely reluctant to attribute the unconsti-
tutionality of the Louisiana statute to the state legislature's clearly improper
motive. While Justice Sutherland dwelled at length on the history of
"taxes on knowledge," he declined to mention the political and historical
context of the Louisiana tax in the Court's reported opinion.229 Tension
implicit in the Grosjean decision regarding the weight to be given to the
legislature's motive was a harbinger of things to come. The Court wrote in
1968 that legislative motive was irrelevant in Grosean230 and then in 1978
suggested that legislative motive was instead relevant.231 In 1983 the Court
concluded that Gros/ean had turned on legislative motive,232 but in the
same decision suggested that Grosjean-like evidence of improper motive
was not necessary in order to find a press tax scheme unconstitutional.233
Indeed, in the cases that followed Grosjean, the Court turned to infer-
ring improper intent from the structure, alone, of a tax scheme. This was,
for instance, the essence of its approach to the Minnesota sales and use tax
at issue in Minneapolis Star.234 Minnesota imposed a "use tax" on the cost
of paper and ink products consumed in the production of publication, with
an exemption for (i.e., no use tax imposed on) the first $100,000 worth of
paper and ink consumed by a publication in any calendar year.235 No sales
tax was imposed on newspapers sold at retail. (Other industrial and agri-
cultural "manufacturers" were not taxed on the components used in the
production of goods sold at retail.236) Only a small percentage of the state's
newspapers exceeded the $100,000 threshold and were required to remit a
229. See, e.g., Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 246 (discussing taxes imposed by the British gov-
ernment, in England and in the colonies, that "had, and were intended to have, the effect of
curtailing the circulation of newspapers, and particularly the cheaper ones whose readers
were generally found among the masses").
230. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968) ("[Tjhe purpose of the legis-
lation was irrelevant.").
231. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (emphasizing the "plain purpose"
of the Louisiana scheme).
232. Minneapolis Star & Trib. 460 U.S. at 579-80; see also Leathers, 499 U.S. at 444-
45 (noting that the Grosjean Court had described the "tradition of taxes imposed exclu-
sively on the press" as an "invidious form of censorship.., intended to curtail the circula-
tion of newspapers and thereby prevent the people from acquiring knowledge of government
activities" and that the "Court held that the tax at issue in Grosjean was of this type and
was therefore unconstitutional").
233. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 580.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 575.
236. Id. at 577.
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use tax-fourteen out of 388 in 1974, and sixteen out of 374 in 1975.237
Nothing in the statute's legislative history, however, suggested anything
inappropriate or unusual in the minds of the legislature when crafting this
scheme (certainly nothing like the Louisiana legislature's motive in Gros-
jean)."28 The Court, per Justice O'Connor, found this scheme "facially
discriminatory" and thus subject to exacting scrutiny for two reasons.239
First, the scheme "single[d] out publications for treatment that is unique in
Minnesota law" 24 -i.e., other manufacturers were not subject to a use tax
in lieu of a sales tax; "the Minnesota use tax treated the press differently
from other enterprises."241 Second, the scheme "targeted a small group of
newspapers" -i.e., only a handful of publishers [paid] any tax at all."242
As to the first: the Minneapolis Star Court took the position that ap-
plication to the press of an economic regulation to which "other busi-
nesses" (similarly situated?) are not subject per se triggers strict scrutiny.243
"The 'differential treatment' standard that the Court has conjured up,"
Justice Rehnquist complained, "is unprecedented and unwarranted." 2"
"To my knowledge," he added, "this court has never subjected govern-
mental action to the most stringent constitutional review solely on the basis
of 'differential treatment' of particular groups. 245 Justice O'Connor ex-
plained, however, that "differential treatment, unless justified by some spe-
cial characteristic of the press, suggests that the goal of the regulation is not
unrelated to suppression of expression."24 6 (Thus although the Court had
five pages earlier suggested that a finding of improper legislative motive
would not be necessary in order to invalidate a press tax scheme on First
Amendment grounds, it returned to the paradigm of taxes on knowledge.
Differential treatment in a tax scheme, Justice O'Connor suggested, gives
rise to a suspicion of illicit motive.)247 This portion of Minneapolis Star
makes some sense. If a legislature enacts one economic regulation for "the
press" and another, wholly different, for "all others" (or "all other busi-
237. Id. at 578.
238. See id. at 580 & n.3.
239. Id. at 581.
240. Id. at 582.
241, See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227-28 (1987) (de-
scribing Minneapolis Star scheme).
242. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 581-82.
243. Id. at 585.
244. Id. at 598 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 585 (emphasis added).
247. As Justice O'Connor would later note, however, the Court "found no evidence of
impermissible legislative motive in Minneapolis Star apart from the structure of the tax
itself." Leathers, 499 U.S. at 445.
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nesses" or "all others who use paper"), this surely merits a raised eyebrow
and a closer look. Still, Minnesota offered a plausible explanation for the
substitution of a use tax for a sales tax--difficulties with administration of
a sales tax, given the proliferation of newspaper vending machines and pa-
perboys on street corners.248
The second aspect of Minneapolis Star is troubling, however. It is the
notion that a tax scheme (a) applying a use tax to all newspapers, and (b)
affording to every newspaper a $100,000 credit, somehow targets those few
papers whose use exceeds the threshold and who must thus pay tax on the
use exceeding the threshold. The notion is that a generally available credit
limited in amount somehow targets those who avail themselves of the
credit just as much as everyone else but who find they still have "uses" (or
sales, or income) on which tax must be paid.249 Thus, if rather than re-
ceiving a property tax exemption, charitable organizations were allowed to
exempt from taxation their first $20,000 in property value (i.e., if they were
allowed a $20,000 credit), presumably the Minneapolis Star decision would
require us to conclude that the legislature had actually targeted charitable
organizations with real property valued at more than $20,000.25" This re-
sult, despite the fact that such organizations pay far less in taxes under the
scheme than they otherwise would. If it were true that all Catholic
churches owned property valued at less than $20,000 and all (or most)
Protestant churches owned at least $100,000 in property, then indeed one
would want to look twice.2 1 But Justice O'Connor took the position that
248. One might posit for comparison a state legislature's decision that the administra-
tive and conceptual difficulties attendant to taxing the income of non-profit entities require
it to adopt a special alternative tax for such entities, perhaps a fixed percentage of each en-
tity's increase in net worth (or a fixed percentage of its annual operating expenses, or some
other figure). The explanation would be less persuasive if this special alternative were to
apply only to some non-profit entities--say, religious ones.
249. See Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 603 (describing the scheme as providing "a
$4,000 credit which benefits all newspapers") (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
250. Suppose that the city of New York, rather than enacting the scheme at issue in
Walz, enacted a property tax on all privately held real property, and exempted as to all non-
profit organizations (including churches) the first $100,000 altogether worth of real prop-
erty. The state is, as we already know, free to exempt the property. It is also, we assume,
free to tax the property just like all other real property. Instead, however, it chooses to do as
Minnesota did in Minneapolis Star, and afford a limited exemption to all nonprofits. Moti-
vated by nothing more than a desire not to unduly burden entities that are deemed socially
useful and that are thought often to be financially struggling, applicable to all nonprofits
(thereby not" preferring" religion to irreligion), such a scheme is unremarkable.
251. Indeed, one might want to look twice even if the legislature was unaware of this
fact. A hypothetical will illustrate the point. Suppose the legislature of Oregon were con-
cerned about deforestation and the resulting harm to both the state's spotted owl population
and the state's appeal to tourists. Suppose the legislature decided to impose a use tax on all
entities using non-recycled paper-whether the entity is McDonalds (Big Mac cartons) or
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the mere possibility of disparate impact justified strict scrutiny. "[T]he
danger from a tax scheme that targets a small number of speakers is the
danger of censorship," she would write, and "a tax on a small number of
speakers runs the risk of affecting a limited range of views."252 But in the
absence of an effect on content, such a scheme is, as Justice Rehnquist
wrote, merely an economic classification and subject only to rational basis
review. 253 There is time enough later for the Court to strike down schemes
that actually have a discriminatory effect.254
In 1987, in the course of reviewing an Arkansas sales tax exemption,
the Court "uncovered" yet a third type of" differential taxation." Ragland
Scott (toilet paper) or Time Warner (Time Magazine)-in an effort (a) partly to build a fund
for reforestation efforts, and (b) partly to discourage the use of non-recycled paper. A use
tax on paper is not unlike a use tax on ink and paper (as in Minneapolis Star)--it goes to a
product at the very heart of the "free press" process, to a product incontrovertibly part of
the process of communication. That it is a tax merely on the use of non-recycled paper is
interesting, but there is nothing about non-recycled paper per se that makes one suspect that
the tax is "even more" about the free press than a tax on the use of all paper. Nor is the use
tax applied only to press users of non-recycled paper; it applies to all uses of the paper, by
any entity whatsoever. Let us stipulate, however, that at least for the first dozen years the
scheme is in place, recycled paper is considerably more expensive than non-recycled paper,
and that some of the cheaper newspapers, some of the more specialized and less widely read
ones, are both unable to pay the stiff use tax and unable to purchase non-recycled paper.
Another example using products less obviously associated with expression might be a
use tax on "aluminum parts," meant to discourage the use of aluminum and encourage the
use of steel, in light of the fact that the production of aluminum parts requires the use of
enormous quantities of water, which is in increasingly short supply. We might stipulate that
aluminum engraving plates are less expensive to make than steel ones, and that the trade-off
is a less crisp image. We might also stipulate that cheap printing press parts made of alumi-
num are widely used by the "cheap" end of the publishing trade. Imagine again here that
some of the "low end" publications are unable to make a go of it-too undercapitalized to
invest in steel parts, but also too "cash poor" to pay an annual use tax on aluminum parts.
In these examples, the legislature's motives are irreproachable. But one must surely
consider the possibility that the schemes violate the First Amendment Free Press Clause,
despite being innocently motivated and despite the fact that they do not treat the press any
differently than other enterprises, because they threaten the very core of the free speech and
free press process-i.e., they will have the indisputable effect of favoring entrenched inter-
ests and squelching less popular voices. It will be the extreme case, however, that will vio-
late the First Amendment Cf Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 391 ("The Free
Exercise Clause... does not require the State to grant appellant an exemption from its gen-
erally applicable sales and use tax. Although it is of course possible to imagine that a more
onerous tax rate, even if generally applicable, might effectively choke off an adherent's
religious practices, we face no such situation in this case.").
252. Leathers, 499 U.S. at 448.
253. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 599 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
254. See Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(" [T]his Court which so often has defeated the attempt to tax in certain ways can defeat the
attempt to discriminate or otherwise go too far without wholly abolishing the power to tax.
The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits.")
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involved a sales tax on all receipts on the sale of tangible personal property,
with an exemption for certain publishers deemed by the state legislature to
be "fledgling" and "struggling" and to have limited market share and ad-
vertising revenue.255  Rather than indicating, however, that exemption
would be afforded to publications with "a market share below X percent"
or "an annual advertising budget of fewer than X dollars," the legislature
explicitly exempted religious, professional, trade, and sports journals.
Without regard to the fact that the statute explicitly exempted journals by
content (religious, professional, trade, and sports journals) and solely by
virtue of the fact that some publications were taxed and some were not,256
Justice Marshall held the Arkansas scheme to be one of the differential
taxation schemes that "suffers from the second type of discrimination
identified in Minneapolis Star" (i.e., that only some publishers pay sales
tax)257 The Arkansas scheme was not, however, like the Minneapolis
scheme: Minnesota exempted-as to all publications-the first $20,000 of
use, taxing only those whose use exceeded $20,000 and only to the extent it
did; Arkansas fully exempted some publications and fully taxed others.
(The same would be true of a modified Ragland scheme, wherein a com-
plete exemption was afforded to "all publications with a market share be-
low X percent" or "all publications with a circulation below X." This
255. Ragland, 481 U.S. at 232.
256. That the statute on its face distinguished between publications by content for the
purposes of taxable status was addressed later in the opinion. The mere fact that some were
taxed and some were not was deemed adequate to trigger strict scrutiny. Nor did the Court
appear to contemplate distinguishing between legislative distinctions that serve as a legiti-
mate proxy for fledgling or small-revenue status and distinctions intended to suppress in-
formation (e.g., a variation of the Ragland scheme wherein exemption is afforded to maga-
zines opposing Huey Long). A content-based distinction truly intended to favor some
content over other content would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to justify. Take by way
of example a state property tax levied on certain churches but not others, that levy depend-
ing by its very terms on whether the church adhered to the doctrine of transubstantiation.
Imagine that non-profits are ordinarily exempt and that churches are ordinarily exempt, and
that one sentence in the portion of the tax code addressing such exemptions provides: this
exemption shall not apply, however, to churches that adhere to the doctrine of transubstan-
tiation.
Putting aside the obvious questions about administration and enforceability, it should
be fairly obvious that the equal protection clause does not permit the legislature to draw
distinctions between churches based on the religion doctrine (or between individuals based
on their religious beliefs), to classify people or churches in this way and treat them differ-
ently in the tax code. It seems unlikely a legislature could articulate a sufficiently compel-
ling reason for this differential treatment. Not only could the scheme be challenged under
the Equal Protection Clause, but it also fits comfortably within the usual notion of an "un-
constitutional condition" insofar as the local Catholic diocese must choose between re-
nouncing the doctrine of transubstantiation, on the one hand, and paying a tax on its real
property, on the other.
257. Ragland, 481 U.S. at 229.
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variation simply eliminates the worrisome designation of taxable status by
content.)
The theory of First Amendment constraints on press taxation schemes
elaborated in Minneapolis Star and Ragland has been dubbed the theory of
"differential taxation of the press." It amounts to the notion that the First
Amendment Free Press Clause (and presumably also the First Amendment
Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause) prohibits a legislature
from drawing any lines in its taxation schemes that divide (intentionally or
incidentally) those who exercise First Amendment rights, or that separate
them from those who do not, without regard to what the legislature meant
to do and without regard to the scheme's actual effect (if any) on the exer-
cise of the First Amendment rights in question. The analysis of the Court
in these cases-particularly Minneapolis Star-is vaguely reminiscent of
the McGlotten court's reliance on its own sense of what is "normal" in a
tax scheme and what is not.25 This is far removed from the straightfor-
ward purpose-and-effect doctrine at the heart of Gros/ean-the notion that
the legislature may not seek to do indirectly (through a tax scheme) what it
may not, consistent with the constitution, do directly (through licensing,
regulation, or the criminal law)."'
258. As should be apparent from the textual discussion, the Court's way of describing
and characterizing press tax schemes is in places oddly dissonant with its characterization of
similarly structured religious tax schemes-sometimes structural choices are imbued with
substantive significance and sometimes they are not. This inconsistency over substantive
treatment of structural choices lies at the heart of the cacophony in the press tax cases and is
ultimately a focal point in the debate over tax expenditure analysis.
259. See, e.g., Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 43 (1922). Dissenting in
Ragland, Justice Scalia summarized what he perceived to be the problem with the new ap-
proach. The problem, he wrote, is that" failure to exempt" (taxation) is deemed tantamount
to "regulation" (i.e., to legislating with a view to achieving some goal other than revenue
raising). 481 U.S. at 236 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his view this is error because failure to
exempt is equivalent to failure to subsidize. And the government's failure to subsidize the
exercise of constitutional rights is not subject to strict scrutiny. See id (citing Taxation with
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544, 549; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 324-26
(1980)); see also Adler, supra note 109, at 873 (noting that the implication of treating ex-
emptions as subsidies is that unconstitutional conditions subsidy cases apply); Swomley,
supra note 167, at 598 (" Tax exemption and deductibility of contributions also affect relig-
ious liberty when the government can curb church efforts to influence legislation by pro-
scribing certain communication [via the § 501(c)(3) ban on lobbying] .... mhe govem-
ment tells the churches that in exchange for certain material benefits, they may not engage
in certain written or spoken communication."). Prior to Congress's 1934 inclusion in the
Internal Revenue Code of an explicit prohibition on lobbying, the I.R.S. and the courts
tended to infer such a restriction in the word "charity." See also Slee v. Commissioner, 42
F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.); see generally Slye, supra note 6, at 273-74. The
1934 amendment provided that "no substantial part" of the activities of an organization
seeking exemption under § 501(c)(3) could be the "carrying on of propaganda, or otherwise
attempting to influence legislation." This portion of the 1934 legislation was added in the
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In 1991, Justice O'Connor and the Court stepped away from the dif-
ferential taxation theory. Like Ragland, Leathers v. Medlock involved the
Arkansas sales tax scheme pursuant to which a four percent tax was im-
posed on receipts from sales of all tangible personal property and on re-
ceipts from sales of selected (i.e., enumerated) services. Prior to 1987, re-
ceipts from subscription newspaper sales, over-the-counter newspaper
sales, and subscription magazine sales were not taxed, nor (by virtue of
omission from the enumeration) were the sales of cable television services
or satellite services to home dish owners.26" In 1987, the state legislature
amended the statute, adding cable television services to the list of services
the sale of which would be taxed. 261 Thus the first issue before the Court
was the constitutionality of the post-1987 scheme whereby (a) cable televi-
sion service sales were taxed, while (b) satellite service sales were not, and
(c) newspaper and magazine sales were not.262 In 1989, the legislature
again amended the statute, adding all television, video, and radio service
sales to the list of taxed services-leaving a scheme, the constitutionality of
which was also before the Court, whereby (a) the sale of all television
services was taxed and (b) the sale of newspapers and magazines was
not.263
In both the 1987 and the 1989 schemes, the legislature drew lines (i.e.,
these entities are taxed and these are not) between different media-print
and satellite versus cable in 1987, then print versus all audiovisual in 1989.
If all of these entities constitute "the press" for First Amendment Free
Press Clause purposes, then it is difficult to see why this scheme is not
subject to strict scrutiny under the sweeping "differential taxation of the
press" theory developed in Minneapolis Star and Ragland. And yet Justice
O'Connor wrote, for seven members of the Court, that "the fact that cable
is taxed differently from other media does not by itself.., raise First
Amendment concerns." 264  Neither "intermedia" nor "intramedia" dis-
Senate as a floor amendment, and was apparently aimed at curbing the activities of the Na-
tional Economy League. 78 CONG. REc. 5861 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Reed) (amendment
sponsor). The present formulation dates to a floor amendment introduced to the Senate in
1954 by then-Senator Lyndon Johnson; it was primarily intended to prevent sham nonprofit
organizations from lobbying for their major donors. See Anne Berrill Carroll, Religion,
Politics, and the IRS: Defining the Limits of Tax Law Controls on Political Expression by
Churches, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 217, 228 (1992); KELLEY, supra note 106, at 12.
260. Leathers, 499 U.S. at 442.
261. Id.
262. See id.
263. Id. at 443.
264. Leathers, 499 U.S. at 444. The Court has, of course, permitted differential treat-
ment of media in other First Amendment contexts. Compare Miami Herald Pub. Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254-55 (1974) with Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367,
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crimination, she wrote, violates the First Amendment absence evidence of
intent to suppress speech or an actual effect on the expression of particular
ideas.265 "[D]ifferential taxation of speakers, even members of the press,"
the Court wrote, "does not implicate the First Amendment unless the tax is
directed at, or presents the danger of suppressing particular ideas." 266 This
was a significant retreat from Minneapolis Star. "Inherent in the power to
tax," the Court wrote, "is the power to discriminate in taxation. 267 Both
schemes were sustained.268
A great deal of ink has been spilt over the Court's press tax jurispru-
dence-much, for instance, about how (if at all) these cases can be recon-
ciled with each other and how (if at all) they are to be squared with the Free
Press Clause. The point of this extended excursion through the press cases
is to do neither. It is to demonstrate the ways in which the Court has
worked through, and indeed for a time strayed from, the basic principle that
a legislature may not (ab)use its taxing power to penalize the exercise of
constitutional rights or to achieve an end that infringes on rights protected
by the First Amendment. This principle is as important in the church-state
context as it is in the free press context, and necessarily bears on the ques-
tion of religious exemptions, tax and otherwise. One must ask whether the
legislature intended to accomplish something other than revenue raising,
i.e., whether the legislature sought to accomplish something indirectly
rather than directly, and then whether this end is forbidden to the legisla-
ture, either because it lies outside the scope of the legislature's powers (as
will be the case with Congress more often than with a state legislature) or
because it runs afoul of a free-standing constraint on the exercise of legis-
lative power (like the First Amendment).
One other aspect of the press tax cases bears on religious tax exemp-
tions. Justice O'Connor suggested in Minneapolis Star that the "granting"
of exemptions provides a legislature with inappropriate leverage over the
exercise of constitutional rights. "[T]he very selection of the press for spe-
cial treatment threatens the press," she wrote,
386-87 (1969).
265. Leathers, 499 U.S. at 450. Justice Marshall (who had written the Ragland opin-
ion) and Justice Blackmun dissented, noting that Leathers marked a significant departure
from the earlier press tax cases. Id at 454.
266. Id. at 453.
267. Id, at 451; see Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1959)
("The States have a very wide discretion in the laying of their taxes .... [T]he States have
the attribute of sovereign powers in devising their fiscal systems to ensure revenue and fos-
ter their local interests. The States may impose different specific taxes upon different trades
and professions and may vary the rate of excise upon various products.").
268. Leathers, 499 U.S. at 453.
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with the possibility of subsequent differentially more burdensome
treatment. Thus, even without actually imposing an extra burden on
the press, the government might be able to achieve censorial effects,
for '[t]he threat of sanctions may deter [the] exercise [of First
Amendment rights] almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions.'
269
In other words, the "power to exempt" could be abused, and the First
Amendment protects the press from the potential of abuse.270  This met
with vigorous dissent from Justices Rehnquist and White, who pointed out
that the Court does not ordinarily invalidate legislative power on the theory
that it could be abused.27' In both the press context and the religious con-
text, we must of course be on guard for instances where a legislature has
"granted" tax-exempt status (refrained from taxing) and retained for itself
some degree of discretion in its continuance-discretion which can be (and
then actually is) wielded in a way so as to interfere or obstruct the exercise
of constitutionally protected rights.272 To expand this to encompass all tax
269. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 588 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963)); see also Benjamin Lombard, Note, First Amendment Limits on the Use of Taxes to
Subsidize Selectively the Media, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 106, 134 (1992) (" [T]he logic of Min-
neapolis Star dictates that a subsidy has at least as great a potential for censorial abuse as
does the direct imposition of a burden on the press. Once the legislature subjects a medium
to a general tax, the state loses any potential leverage with respect to that medium. Any
changes in the taxes on the medium must similarly affect all other businesses also subject to
the tax. By granting a tax subsidy, however, the state can [force] financial dependence on
the medium if the state retains the discretion to remove the subsidy.").
270. See Leathers, 499 U.S. at 458 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The nondiscrimination
principle protects the press from censorship prophylactically, condemning any selective-
taxation scheme that presents the 'potential for abuse' by the state.").
271. See Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 601-02 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 594,
596 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
272. One might make this point about the Bob Jones case, for instance. Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 595-96 (1983) (holding 8 to 1 as a matter of statutory
construction that private schools with racially discriminatory policies are not "charities" for
the purposes of the charitable contribution deduction in 26 U.S.C. § 170 or tax-exempt
status of 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), because these provisions refer to "charity" in the common
law sense of the word, which incorporates national public policy); id at 586 (noting "un-
mistakable evidence that underlying all relevant parts of the Code is the intent that entitle-
ment to tax exemption depends on meeting certain common law standards of charity-
namely that an institution seeking tax exempt status must serve a public purpose and not be
contrary to established public policy"). Professor Whitehead argues that this holding effec-
tively permits the I.R.S. to revoke the tax-exempt status of churches if their religious doc-
trine does not coincide with national public policy. Whitehead, supra note 7, at 556-57.
Although one would assume that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine would prohibit the
I.R.S. from doing so, this is precisely what happened in Bob Jones. Racial discrimination
was deemed incontrovertibly contrary to national public policy, and thus organizations
(even institutions committed to racial segregation for religious reasons, as Bob Jones Uni-
versity itself claimed to be) were to be denied tax-exempt status if they discriminated ra-
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exemptions applicable to entities exercising protected rights, however, is to
eviscerate the legislative power to write tax schemes and to raise revenue.
B. Justice Harlan's Equal Protection Theory
1. Texas Monthly
In 1989 the Court had an opportunity to bring its press tax jurispru-
dence to bear on religious tax exemptions. The fragmented result stands as
a testament to the continuing confusion over the constitutional relevance of
structural choices in a tax code.
Prior to 1984, Texas exempted from sales and use tax all magazine
subscriptions running half a year or longer and classified as second class
mail.273 Texas repealed the exemption in 1984 and began to tax such
magazines just as it taxed other items sold at retail, but continued to exempt
"periodicals published or distributed by a religious faith consisting entirely
of writings promulgating the teaching of the faith, along with books con-
sisting solely of writings sacred to a religious faith.1 274  Before the Su-
preme Court, Texas offered the explanation that it wished to avoid the en-
tanglement it thought inherent in taxation and to avoid any violation of the
Free Exercise Clause. 275 A plurality of the Court noted, however, that
Texas's fears were unfounded; taxation would have violated neither the
Establishment Clause nor the Free Exercise Clause.
276
The scheme of course involved no direct subsidy-no violation of the
tax-and-spend prohibition of the Establishment Clause (assuming it appli-
cable to the states). We can lay aside as mooted by history the question
whether the scheme should have been sustained as the state's own determi-
cially. A variation on Bob Jones might be an I.R.S. decision that "abortion" is contrary to
national public policy, and its subsequent revocation of § 501(c)(3) "tax exempt" status
from any non-profit hospitals and health clinics performing them or mentioning them.
273. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989).
274. Id. at 5-6. Such a provision is commonplace in state tax codes. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 212.06(b)(9) (1989) (exempting from sales tax sale of" religious publications,
bibles, hymn books, prayer books, vestments, altar paraphernalia, sacramental chalices, and
like church service and ceremonial raiments and equipment"); GA. STAT. § 48-8-3 (1998)
(exempting "sale or use of Holy Bibles, testaments, and similar books commonly recog-
nized as being Holy Scripture").
275. Texas Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. at 17.
276. Id. at 21 (" [T]he 'routine and factual inquiries' commonly associated with the
enforcement of tax laws bear no resemblance to the kind of government surveillance the
Court has previously held the pose an intolerable risk of government entanglement with
religion."); id. at 18 (Free Exercise Clause); see also Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S.
378, 384-90, 392 (collection of generally applicable sales and use tax from religious organi-
zation did not violate Establishment Clause or Free Exercise Clause).
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nation of the proper treatment of religion, un-addressed by the First as well
as the Fourteenth amendments. The wrinkle here is that religious publica-
tions were clearly treated differently from other publications under the law,
as written. Treated differently, and, indeed, better. The Texas scheme
"benefited" religion insofar as publishers of religious magazines were ex-
empted from a financial burden imposed on publishers of non-religious
magazines. 277 And the scheme was clearly intended to have an effect on
religious publishers qua religious publishers; it was not merely intended to
assist fledgling publishers (Ragland) or to avoid administration of a cum-
bersome or awkward tax (Minneapolis Star) that then simply happened
coincidentally to apply only to religious publications. Given the special
place that religion has under our constitutional scheme, given the existence
of a constitutional amendment addressing both "free exercise" and "estab-
lishment," such a law is worth at least a second look. Given the unassail-
able fact that so-called revenue raising schemes are sometimes designed to
have a secondary effect unrelated to the raising of revenue, or sometimes
even a primary effect unrelated to the raising of revenue, one must pause
here.
Both plurality (striking the scheme) and dissent (which would have
sustained the scheme) thought Walz directly on point.27 The plurality took
Walz to approve benefits flowing to religious organizations if and only if
such benefits also flow to a large number of non-religious organizations. 27 9
The dissent contended, however, that "[t]his is not a plausible reading of
the opinion." 280 Instead, Walz was based on the principle of "accommo-
dation"; it was, Justice Scalia wrote "just one of a long line of cases in
which we have recognized that the government may (and sometimes must)
accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating the
Establishment Clause."281
277. Consistent with Professor Surrey's theories, the plurality characterized this as a
subsidy. See Texas Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. at 14 ("Every tax exemption constitutes a sub-
sidy that affects nonqualifying taxpayers, forcing them to become 'indirect and vicarious
donors."') (quoting Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 591).
278. See id. at I 1 (plurality) (Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, JJ) (Walz is "the case most
nearly on point") (striking the scheme); id. at 33 (dissent) (Rehnquist, CJ, Scalia, Kennedy,
JJ) (Walz is "in all relevant respects identical") (voting to sustain the scheme).
279. See id. at 11-12 (suggesting Walz would have turned out differently if the property
tax in question had not been available to "a wide array of nonprofit organizations"); see
also id. at 11 ("The provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups is an important
index of secular effect.") (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981)).
280. Id. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
281. Id. at 38. This principle, he wrote, supports the exemption of "religious groups
(and only religious groups) from Title VII's antidiscrimination provisions," id at 39, as
well as the parsonage exclusions in the various state income tax codes and the federal in-
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Walz, however, was not on point. The Texas scheme and the New
York scheme were structured differently, had different purposes, and had
very different effects. The explicit goal of the Texas legislation was "ac-
commodation of religion"-no other goal seems even plausible-in the
sense of relieving religion (qua religion) from a burden imposed on others,
so as to further the constitutional value of free exercise and to avoid any
troubling (if not particularly constitutionally problematic) entanglement
between state and religion. The property tax exemption at issue in Walz
had been carved, since the beginning, for churches and for other nonprofit
entities. And although various explanations have been offered over time-
in New York and elsewhere-for such arrangements, they largely relate
(and, in New York, did relate) to the things that churches and nonprofits
have in common with each other--e.g., the social benefit they are deemed
to provide and the extra hardship that taxation might cause in light of their
low coffers. In short, the New York scheme embraced both churches and
other nonprofit organizations and was justified by an explanation reasona-
bly and fairly related to what such entities had in common. This makes the
Walz scheme unlikely to be a situation of legislative "accommodation of
religion" and thus, very much unlike the Texas Monthly scheme. 2
Justice White offered an attractive alternative in his short concurrence.
He believed the Texas scheme violative of the free press clause and wrote
that Ragland was "directly applicable here." 283 In his view, both the Texas
scheme and the Arkansas scheme in Ragland were flawed because they
differentiated between publications on the basis of content for tax purposes,
in violation of the Free Press Clause.284 (Of course, the Free Press Clause
does not "absolutely" forbid legislative distinctions carved by content, any
more than the Free Speech Clause "absolutely" forbids content-based dis-
crimination. 5 There may well be a presumption against the constitution-
ality of both, but it does not end the inquiry to observe that the Texas leg-
islature had differentiated by content.) The schemes, however, are
distinguishable on the point of the legislature's purpose: Arkansas claimed
to be concerned about financially-struggling magazines and to have se-
lected by topic (choosing those it viewed as likely to be struggling) as a
come tax code, id. at 33 n.3.
282. A Texas Monthly-like variation of Walz would have been a state property tax ex-
emption available only to churches, in the name of" accommodating" religion.
283. Texas Monthly, Inc. 489 U.S. at 26 (White, J., concurring).
284. It is worth noting, however, that Justice Marshall's opinion in Ragland purported
to strike the Arkansas scheme without regard to the fact that it distinguished by content, see
supra, and that Justice Marshall did not join Justice White's concurrence. Id.




proxy for conducting individualized inquiries;28 6 Texas claimed nothing
more than to be selecting religious magazines as such and because they
were religious.28 7 Thus, Ragland is not on point. But Justice White's point
is well-taken.
Ultimately the question at the heart of the Texas Monthly discord is
the extent to which government may deliberately exempt religion (religious
organizations, religious persons, and religious publishers) from burden-
some laws. Might-for instance-a religion-only exemption raise legiti-
mate and troubling questions about government endorsement or approval of
religion? Might it at some point cross some sort of "line" into an imper-
missible preferencing of religion over non-religion? What is one to do
about the possibility that "other entities" (non-religious ones) may in some
instances be able to articulate a plausible reason for being included within
the scope of such an exemption (a plausible reason in the form of a show-
ing that in some way they are "relevantly similar")?
When the legislature carves an exemption in the name of accommo-
dation and means in particular to further the free exercise of religion (rather
than to further the separation of church and state), the answer may well lie
in Justice Harlan's opinion in Welsh v. United States, and specifically his
theory of the "equal protection mode of analysis" required by the Estab-
lishment Clause.2"8 In concluding that the Establishment Clause required
conscientious objector status to be extended to Elliott Welsh-whose ob-
jection to military service stemmed from a "belief in and devotion to good-
ness and virtue for their own sakes" and a conclusion that war is "unethi-
cal" 289-Justice Harlan wrote that (a) "the critical question is whether the
scope of legislation encircles a class so broad that it can be fairly concluded
that [all groups that] could be thought to fall within the natural perimeter
[are included]"; and (b) the radius of the conscientious objector statute was
"the conscientiousness with which an individual opposes war in gen-
eral."290 And, thus, if the exemption were to be applied, it would necessar-
ily (logically, and fairly) include individuals "whose beliefs emanate from
a purely moral, ethical, or philosophical source."29' Anything else would
be, in Harlan's terms, a "religious gerrymander." 2 92
286. Ragland, 481 U.S. at231.
287. Texas Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. at 5.
288. 398 U.S. 333, 356. (1970).
289. Id. at 338.
290. Id. at 357.
291. Id. at 358.
292. Id. at 357; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (RFRA violates Establishment Clause because "the statute has provided the
Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain," which amounts to "gov-
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The equal treatment inquiry is, by necessity, a case-by-case inquiry
and a relatively intuitive one. It involves an examination of the legisla-
ture's purpose in carving a religious exemption in the first instance, and an
inquiry into whether there exist other entities who are relevantly similar
(given the legislature's purpose or given the logical and fair radius of the
exemption), such that exempting them would serve effectively the same
purpose and thereby avoid any implicit preferencing of religion over non-
religion.293 This principle ultimately echoes the lessons of Grosjean and
Bailey: if the legislature, under the guise of exercising its power to raise
revenue, seeks to achieve other goals, those other goals should be inde-
pendently measured against the Constitution. This is why the "equal pro-
tection" concept is helpful in the exemption context; it requires an exami-
nation of the categories created and the lines drawn by the legislature and
an examination of the legislative motive in so doing.294 This is consistent
with the notion of equal treatment (in the sense of not preferring religion to
lack thereof, as well as not preferring one religion to another) that weaves
throughout the history and theory of the Establishment Clause. If the leg-
islature exempts churches from property tax and claims to be doing so in
order to avoid administration of an "income" tax on a "nonprofit" entity,
then surely the Kiwanis Club and the local YMCA should be similarly ex-
emnment preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion"). An analogy can be drawn be-
tween the selective service exemption at issue in Welsh and Seeger and § 1402 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. Section 1401 of the Code imposes a tax on the self-employment income
of individuals. 26 U.S.C. § 1401 (1994). Section 1402(g) provides an exemption to taxpay-
ers conscientiously opposed on religious grounds to accepting the benefits of any public or
private insurance scheme, if certain requirements are met. Id. § 1402(g) (1994). Among the
requirements: the taxpayer must be a member of a "recognized religious sect" and he must
adhere to its "established tenets or teachings" regarding the inappropriateness of accepting
such benefits. Id The exemption is thus not available to a person with identical religious
beliefs who does not belong to a "recognized religious sect" with "established tenets" on
the exact point, see, e.g., May v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2498 (1996), nor is it
available to a Welsh-like conscientious objector, see, e.g., Hughes v. Commissioner, 81 T.C.
683, 683-84 (1983) ("the basis of [his] moral and conscientious objection is not a theistic
one or one arising out of a belief in a supreme being or a higher moral authority, but.., his
deeply felt, personally held moral beliefs transcend philosophy, religion, theology, or poli-
tics, and occupy in his own mind a position parallel to that set of beliefs held by persons
with a belief in God or supreme being, who would otherwise qualify for the exemption un-
der the Code") (stipulation of the parties). It is difficult to envision this narrowly carved
exemption (preferring some religions to others and preferring religious objectors to secular
moral objectors) surviving a Harlanesque review for religious preferentialism.
293. For an elaborate argument that "the Establishment Clause 'right' is essentially
one of equal treatment with respect to religious belief or nonbelief, exercise or nonexer-
cise," and "equal" protection of the free exercise of religion, see Paulsen, supra note 77, at
324-25.
294. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,239-40 (1976).
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empted. If instead the legislature exempted churches from income tax only
because it believed that to do so would further the separation of church and
state, then logically there would be no need to include the Kiwanis Club.
In Texas Monthly, no obvious party lays claim to an equal exemption
grounded in Welsh, except-perhaps-an entity like the Ethical Culture
Society (an organization devoted to questions of "right conduct" and
"ethics") if it were to produce and sell pamphlets or lay out its creed in
book form. But then one might ask whether the works of Aristotle should
be exempt from sales tax, and whether the novels of Ayn Rand should be
exempt from sales tax, as both seek to address basic questions about how
one should live one's life and what values are fundamental. The Ethical
Culture claim seems less convincing than Elliott Welsh's claim. But it is
certainly more easy to imagine a plausible Welsh claim in the Texas con-
text than to imagine one in the context of, say, a federal armed forces uni-
form exemption permitting the use of yarmulkes, turbans, and other relig-
ious headwear. It is difficult to imagine who might plausibly claim an
adequately "similar" situation.295
2. An Application
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA),296 establishes a coop-
erative federal-state unemployment taxation and compensation scheme
whereby federal and state government levy a tax on employers, whose em-
ployees are then entitled to collect unemployment compensation should the
need arise.297 Under FUTA, the federal government imposes an excise tax
on those employers who pay wages to employees in covered employ-
ment.298 It also grants a ninety percent credit (toward that federal excise
tax) for payments made by the employer into a federally-approved state-run
295. If one accepts the proposition that in some instances the Establishment Clause and
the equal protection clause require the government to sweep within the scope of a so-called
religious exemption persons or entities with a Welsh-like claim of sufficient similarity given
the purpose of the exemption and its natural scope, then one must consider the possibility
that in some instances the tax-and-spend prohibition must also extend to such organizations
and persons. That is, presumably a person cannot be forced to contribute three pence to the
propagation of (the advocacy of, the preaching of) the teachings of Ayn Rand or the ethical
writings of William Bennett. If it is true, as Madison wrote, that the care of souls is not
entrusted to the civil magistrate, then government has no business advocating Aristotle's
notion of the virtuous life.
296. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-11 (1994).
297. See Stewart Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937) (sustaining scheme
against Tenth Amendment challenge); California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393,
396-98 (1982) (detailing a history of FUTA).
298. 26 U.S.C. § 3301 (1994).
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unemployment compensation scheme.299 FUTA provides minimum stan-
dards for a state scheme: a participating state must cover certain organiza-
tions, but as to others, it may levy unemployment compensation taxes on
such organizations and provide unemployment compensation to their em-
ployees, as it sees fit.3" At present, the scheme permits states to decline
coverage to several segments of the labor force, including persons em-
ployed by churches, employees of very small nonprofit organizations,
elected state officials, and inmates at penal institutions."' Generally
speaking participating states must cover nonprofit organizations; however
they need not cover religious employers.
The Rhode Island state-run federally-approved unemployment com-
pensation scheme was recently the subject of an unsuccessful Establish-
ment Clause challenge. 0 2 In Rhode Island, churches and individual par-
ishes may choose whether to be exempt from the state's unemployment
compensation scheme, but § 501(c)(3) entities may not choose.0 3 Rather,
the participation of § 501(c)(3) entities is mandatory, although each may
choose to "self-insure" with substantial regulatory oversight.304 The Sal-
vation Army, for instance, which is considered a church, may choose-and
has chosen-to be exempt. A non-religious non-profit employer in Rhode
Island performing substantially the same functions and services as the Sal-
vation Army-if indeed there is such an entity--could not similarly choose
to be exempt.30 '
299. 26 U.S.C. § 3302 (1994).
300. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3304, 3309 (1994).
301. Id.
302. Rojas v. Fitch, 127 F.3d 184, 188 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2341
(1998). Rhode Island's unemployment compensation scheme can be found at R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 28-42 to 28.44 (1997).
303. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-42 to 28.44 (1997).
304. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-42 to 28.44 (1997).
305. A religious organization in Rhode Island is unlikely to bring any sort of challenge
to this scheme, of course, since it has the option to participate or not, as it sees fit. A tax-
payer (whether a citizen paying general state taxes or an employer paying the specific un-
employment compensation tax) would have little reason to complain, since employees of
exempt organizations are not entitled to collect unemployment compensation. Nor, then,
would such a person have standing to argue a violation of the Establishment Clause's tax-
and-spend prohibition. The scheme clearly involves no expenditure of tax funds. But one
can easily imagine legitimately aggrieved parties: General Motors, a for-profit organization,
noting that it is obligated to participate in a government-run insurance scheme when it might
prefer to self-insure (like non-profits) or to have the choice of entirely opting out (like re-
ligious non-profits); Planned Parenthood, a non-profit organization, arguing that although
offered the option of self-insuring, it is denied the option of exemption that is afforded to
religious non-profits; the local homeless shelter, also non-profit and performing some of the
same functions as the Salvation Army, arguing that it is relevantly similar and entitled ac-
cordingly to opt out; or even an employee of the Salvation Army, arguing that she was de-
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One thing that makes the federal scheme particularly interesting is the
complicated thirty-year history of FUTA exemptions. Prior to 1970, all
"religious, charitable, educational, or other tax-exempt organization[s]"
were exempt from FUTA.3°6 They were not required to pay the federal ex-
cise tax and only paid a state tax if the state's program went beyond the
federal program.0 7 Congress revised FUTA in 1970, maintaining the §
3306(c)(8) exemption for nonprofits from the federal excise tax, but now
requiring nonetheless under § 3304(a)(6)(A) that state plans cover them.3" 8
In 1970 Congress also enacted § 3309(b) which exempted from mandatory
state coverage several classes of employees, including religious and educa-
tional employees (composed of employees of churches or primarily relig-
ious organizations, ministers and members of religious orders, and those in
the employ of a school which was not an institution of higher education).
Then, in 1976, Congress eliminated the educational employee exemp-
tion.30 9 The present scheme includes a variety of exemptions in addition to
the exemption for religious organizations, but it has been argued that in
revoking exemptions over time, Congress studiously avoided revoking the
religious exemption.31 0 Herein, it is argued, lies proof of an emergent leg-
islative intent to "favor" religion.
The claim that the federal government has impermissibly allowed the
state governments to do as they see fit with respect to religious employers
is an unpalatable argument at best, especially given the federalist interpre-
tation of the Establishment Clause. But what of the claim that the federal
government is violating the Establishment Clause because, despite repeat-
edly amending the scheme over time, it continued to preserve an exemption
from mandatory coverage for religious employers? On different facts, this
might be a plausible claim. If New York steadily repealed its property tax
exemptions until the only one left were the religious one, Walz would sud-
denly look very different. Perhaps New York would answer that it felt it
could no longer afford the sweeping property tax exemptions it had tradi-
tionally offered, but that it preferred to "steer clear" of church land and
enmeshing itself in a dispute with local churches. The question that Rojas
asks is whether we treat Walz-Rojas (exemptions repealed until only church
nied unemployment compensation by the state government simply because her employer
was a church and was therefore allowed to choose that its employees not be insured. It is
the latter plaintiff that emerged to challenge the scheme.
306. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 397.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.; see 26 U.S.C. § 3309(a)(1) (1994).
310. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 397.
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exemption left) differently from Walz-Texas Monthly (only church exemp-
tion to begin with). The answer is probably not. Obviously the final prod-
uct is the focus of the constitutional inquiry. And the legislative purpose
will weigh in, appropriately, in both scenarios. The most the federal gov-
emnment's "exclusion from mandatory coverage" accomplishes (i.e., the
extent of its effect) is the delegation of the decision (coverage or not) to the
state level. If the scheme is to fall on First Amendment grounds, then,
surely it is to fall at the state level.
One can imagine a fairly coherent explanation for a three-tiered classi-
fication scheme at the state-level-the distinction between for-profits and
non-profits stemming from the need to reduce administrative burdens and
the need for flexibility in the case of institutions with high turnover, small
staffs, and less-than-stellar accounting practices-and the distinction be-
tween religious non-profits and other non-profits stemming from a desire to
afford flexibility to religious institutions that might prefer for religious rea-
sons not to participate in mandatory government-run insurance schemes
(i.e., "accommodation"). The question must ultimately be whether the
distinction between religious non-profits and non-religious non-profits can
stand; whether-assuming at least some accommodation (in the sense of
exemption from burden imposed on others) is permissible even when not
required by the Free Exercise Clause-there exists an entity that might be
able to articulate a Harlan-Welsh claim of religious gerrymandering in the
Rhode Island scheme and make a plausible claim for similar treatment. A
homeless shelter and a non-profit clinic cannot make a plausible Welsh
claim because they are not relevantly similar: the legislature's purpose was
to accommodate religious organizations that prefer for religious (conscien-
tious) reasons not to participate in insurance schemes.311
311. For an example of a religion-only exemption sustained by the courts, see Cohen v.
City of Des Plaines, 8 F.3d 484, 491 (7th Cir. 1993) (sustaining zoning ordinance that re-
quired operators to day-care centers to obtain special use permits before operating in single-
family residential district and that exempted churches running non-profit day-care centers
from permit requirement). This arrangement, the Court of Appeals wrote, did not establish
religion any more than did the property tax exemption of issue in Walz. Id. at 490. Noting
that care and instruction of the young is often deemed vital by a church, the Seventh Circuit
reasoned that Des Plaines intended to minimize government meddling in religious affairs
and in the decisionmaking process of religious organizations. Id at 490. Especially given
the implication of the Free Exercise Clause (in the right of religious organizations to educate
their young) and in the absence of what the court called a "subsidy" (in the form of a dis-
cernible increase in everyone else's tax bill to compensate), the arrangement was deemed
benign both in purpose and effect. Id. at 491. The Court of Appeals did not have occasion
to address whether other entities would properly belong within the scope of the exemption,
but it seems unlikely given the hybrid nature of the free exercise interests.




Churches and others exercising special First Amendment rights are
not immune to the ordinary burdens or benefits of belonging to civil soci-
ety. However, we clearly stand on a precipice with respect to the notion
that "incidental benefits" may permissibly accrue to religious institutions.
Although absolute separation is unworkable, our ever-expanding concept of
government cannot, consistent with the vision of the framers of the Estab-
lishment Clause, justify an infinitely expanding collection of permissible
incidental benefits. The Establishment Clause must ultimately place some
brakes on this process.
The traditional direct aid prohibition of the Establishment Clause is
not implicated by the typical exemption of a church from state or federal
property and income tax. The tax-and-spend prohibition of the clause is
narrow; it does not and can not extend to exemptions from financially bur-
densome schemes (taxation or otherwise). The future of the Establishment
Clause does not lie in expanding this prohibition-which is strict (not even
"three pence") but limited in scope-to encompass Professor Surrey's tax
expenditures. The possibility of a federalist non-interference interpretation
of the clause (and a narrow reading of how, if at all, the Fourteenth
Amendment might have meant to apply the clause to the states) is probably
forever banished to the scrap heap of historical could-have-beens. How, if
at all, this approach can be resurrected (or even "acknowledged") within
the constraints of our present jurisprudence, with any doctrinal integrity, is
unclear. This may be another challenge for the Clause's future.
It is the primary thesis of this article that religious tax exemption
schemes should be scrutinized with both "purpose and effect" analysis and
an "equal treatment" principle in mind. It is the notion that the clause, or
some combination of the Clause and the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments,
prohibits the favoring of religion over non-religion. The difficult task of
determining when and to what extent others are "similarly situated" and
must be "similarly treated" remains to be explored, and perhaps the most
property tax base "not all bona fide nonprofit homes for the aged but only homes for the
aged owned by religious or Masonic bodies." In re Appeal of Springmoor, Inc., 498 S.E.2d
177, 182 (N.C. 1998) (striking down N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-275(32) (1998)). The exclu-
sion was said to promote and encourage homes for the aged, sick, and infirm. Id. at 184.
This, the court held, for reasons largely identical to those outlined in the text, "results in the
favoring of the religious over the secular." Id. "Religiously affiliated homes are singled
out," the court wrote, "for a tax benefit denied to others that are similarly capable of carry-
ing out the secular objectives" in question. Id. Not at issue in the case was the statutory
framework exempting property used for "educational, scientific, literary, cultural, charita-
ble, or religious purposes." Id. at 181, (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-278.3), and calling
that framework "equivalent to that challenged in Walz."
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vexing questions relate to the concept of accommodation-what the word
means, and whether (and to what extent) the practice is permitted. When a
legislature means to further distance government from religion, one can
hardly claim an Establishment Clause violation. But when a legislature
means to further, or to assist, free exercise, one must be on one's guard for
precisely the sort of institutionalizing favoring of religion that the framers
sought to preclude with a wall of separation. It is only in this way that the
wall of separation between church and state will protect both religious lib-
erty and our secular government.

